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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATI ONS
This is a study ot obligation.

This

is a study of

the great, mysterious el'ements that 11es deep w1 thin the
oral and psychological 11te ot eaoh human being.

The vast

ajority of men take Its pre,enee for granted, as an accustomed
ampanian ot their dally lives.

It has long been considered as

a man as th. breath of his body so that only the

t .. have ever turned explicit attention to analyze
probe this oore of manfs moral being.
Focuslng on obligation, the study here at hand is
all an inquiry.

Our course is one ot investigation

n the pages of an ethical work standing at the summit of prethought, the lichomachean Ethics of Aristotle.
oas the immortal author of the Ethics hold tha't obligation is
rat10nally discernible factor 1n moral 11fe? The aim will
e to determine precisely what idea he has here.
~r1ctly

Can a man be

bound to do or not to do any given action?

hy is it sot And, ot course,

a8

If so,

in all philosophical thought,

this one polnt Is 1ntricately and essentlally involved with
1

2

various other basic concepts .- allot which must be given at
least some consideration so that an

ade~ate

view of the sub-

ject be presented.
It w111 be well to state brietly at the very outset
the precise goal of the investigation.

In other words, betore

one can discover and study the concept ot obligation in a
certain philosophical work, such as the Ethics, It 1s highly
advisable to set down that concept's distinguishing character1stics.
Br1etly, then, obligation, though it may be defined
and described in several ways, may be sald to be the moral
necessity of electing this or that act or course of action
hich is the means to atta1ning an absolutely necessary end.
t 18 not a question of physical compulsion, but moral, and

this moral necessity imposes a certain claim on the will to
hoose tp1sJ not

~.

Closely related to this notion is the

actor ot sanotlon, some penalty accruing to
that which is obligatory and

80

h~

who ignores

missel the end necessary to his

ery nature.
This topic ot obligation holds certain aspects which
tend to strike the student as somewhat surpriSing.

He approaches

t confident that an explicit .. plain-speaking abundance of
hilosopb1cal reasonings awaits the reader's attention, espec-

3
~ally in a classical immortal such as Aristotle.

And in a

treatise long placed at the pinnacle of the pre-Christian moral
~orks

all the more does the student expect that many explicit

r'etlections on obligation will be met.
ptherwise.

But the truth is qu.i t.

Little is mentioned explicitly.

The message is

carried by implication, by assumption, a situation which will
~.quire

that one first of all make definite what has been lett

pnly indefinite, that he seek out the foundations of the moral
~tructure

presented in the Ethics.
It would be well at the outset to note that this study

.ets its sights, by way of delimitation, not on the whole body
pf Aristotelian thought pertaining to his idea of human obligation, but rather on one work only, namely, the Nichomachean
Ethics.

However, we will find ourselves necessarily impelled

to consult other works of his where he discusses those profound
ooncepts, metaphysical and psychological, which he applied to
moral life in the Ethics. For Aristotle was a metaphysician, and
~is

ethical concepts can only be properly grasped when they are

.een metaphysically.
~ise

The Ethics is no set of mere counsels or

utterances on moral matters, it is in "direct contact with

the realm of being"l, a metaphysical study.

But, as pointed out

1 Dietrich von Hildebrand, "The QreatBooks -- VI.
Aristotle", America, November 29, lQ47, page 241.

..

just previously, very much of this foundational metaphysics is
left implicit -- it must be mined because it doe8 not lie on
the surface.
Today, about us, much confusion surrounds current
~dea.

~ind

of obligation.

The common man and the philosopher alike

it somewhat problematical -- the former looks at it, looks

~way,

looks back onoe more, and then deoides to bypass it,

~eaving

rationalizations and justifications to the philosopher.

rhe philosopher does his best with soientifio jargon, but ultimately oonoludes that secular1sm hal made something of a moral
~urio

of familiar Christian ooncepts of obligation.
The times in which we are livins have been plagued by

I

woeful lack ot stable moral values.

The moral edifices of the

lay are insecUl'e in their foundatiOns, flimsy ln their framework,
lndlorely open to ominous assaults of every sort,
~he

In place of

steel structure of Christian ethics have been substituted

~xpedlencYI

mere human decency, and propriety,

The physical

avoc of inter-continental warfare. haa had lts moral counterpart.
Juvenile delinquency at hOMO, delinquency among our
armed foroes abroad, the oynical selflshness of those who
bought or sold in the black markets of the war years, the
current rackets in house-renting and the buying of ·used"
care. the whole mesa of dirty linen that is being washed in
congressional investigations .- what are theae but evidences
of how deeply the secularilt dry-rot baa undermined traditional Christian virtues. 2
2 AlIerioa. November 29. 1947.1>age 231. If Man and Hia Maker".

Yet, for all this, the SCholastic ethlclan can never be
~haken

from hls assurance that some sensltivity, aome awareness

of moral obligation continues to assert ltself with1n the pay~hologlcal

world of each normal man's 11fe.

For 1t 11 a basic

tenet of Scholastic ethics that no normal ratlonal being (defined

as possessing an expedltum

~

rationia) lacks an Inter10r

awareness of the fundamental d1stinction between what is rlght
and what 1e wrong3.- and, moreover, at onoe a further awareness

that somehow he ou&et to elect the good and reject the ev11. 4

Obligatlon. then roote itself deep wlthin the human
3 Th1s important doctrIne has been well expressed 1n
the followlng. "The existence of an Inward monitor that categorlcally d1ctates what we m.ust do, what we must not do, or what
we may do or leave undone, 1s the primary fact of our moral
exper1enoe • • • • Whatever be the nature of th1s fact, howsoever
It may be accounted for by theor1es, or analyzed psycholoeioally,
1 t 1s as patent and universal a tact as any that ever tormed the
eubject-matt«r ot a science. It 1s involved ln all our moral
experlenc" our moral conduct and character." - Timothy J.
BrOSnahan prolesomena ~ Eth1cs.Fordham University Press, New
York.. 194i , ~.

4 On a later page the same author, Brosnahan, brings
out the univereal human awareness of an inter10r "oughtness-.
The fact that we are consc1ous ot areal dlstinct10n between good
and evil may indeed be 1nd1v1dua.lly ver1f1ed by introspect1on,
may be interred In others from manifestations similar to those
that character1ze its worklngs In ourselves, and Is testif1ed to
by the 11terature and laws of all ages. We have, therefore, suoh
ver1ficatlon of its universality as we have of any other mental
qual1ty. We know that others perceiVe color, possess reason,
dislike paIak, reverence upr1ghtnes. only from the unohang1ng
elm11arity ot theIr j'udgments and act10ns w1th ours." (179-180)

6

pagan or Christian, learned or unlearned, rich or poor.

Aa

uoted above, this stands as "the primary tact of our moral
Yet, as also noted above, the present days w1tness
widespread moral (or 1mcoral, or better, amoral) atmosphere in
that interior sense of obligation is either openly challor ignored.

Hence we

ca~

lay easy claim to a title of some

mportanee some significance for any study -- such as our own -ttemptlng to play a part, however modest, in returning proper
tress to a recognition of man'. nature as an obl,iSed nature.
NoW, tor the ph110sopher, obligation 1s a study both
and complex.

Its s1mplicity (a comparative SimplICity,

hat is) resides in the fact that no longer is it an affair of
eat difficulty to establish the truth, as noted above, that
11 men of all ages have somehow acknowledged the element of
bligation 1n human lifa.

But simplicity, wa fear, walks with us

o more once the attempt is begun to render a complete, philosophcal explanation of its nature and presence.

Th1s 1s complex.

this point it w111 be suffic1ent to indicate certain ma1n pOint
the problem, by way of introduction.
Freedom of w111 must first be assumed.

Unless this be

the problem of obligation cannot be even conce1ved.

For

ow 18 one to be UIl4er a moral neoessi ty (duty .. ob11gat1on) where
phys10al neces8ity already compele

~

in this or that act?

ut the, postulat1ng such 11berty, how does it happen that there

'1

~s never·theJ4as this Interior~ moral restriction on the free will
~hich

men have experienced universally'

Is thore some goal for

~uman

life -- established quite independently of the individual"

-

Gonaont or lack of it -- which MUst be reached else the person be
~efin1tively

and permanently classified a failure?

What could

.uCb a goal, such an objective" be to reach into the very heart
pf man, seize it with an

iro~fi8ted

compulSion, a moral compul-

.lon, all the while respecting the freedom of man's will physicall
~
~s

basically'

Indeed, can such a goal really be perceived, or

this sense of obligation an inexplicable mystery, perhaps a

~.re

sentiment?

Is there an authority outside of man capable of

binding, obliging, him'

~o

~oal

By what right' Moreover. perhaps the

1s one which the man call use his free will to ignore and

_till be little the worse of it -- sinco the goal, the end, is
pnly sufficiently compiling for those who just happen to be
~ttracted

by it.

Were this the case, then we have as yet found

po explanation for obligation --

and

it may

be

but

a

mythl

How, when it is said that man ought or ought not ellcl t
~

certain volitional act, it is implied that (1) the proposed

..at is right and good, or wrong and evil, and (2) the will is
~aoed
~he

~.

with an obligation to elicit the good and avo1d that evil.

will, however, clearly remains free physioally.
it morally bound'

reCipient,

80

Why. then,

The anawar i8 that the will has been the

to speak, of a oommand issued by the reasoning

8

faoulty, an unconditioned command that the will elicit that act
which haa been perceIved to be good, and forbidding it to elicit
that act which haa been perceived as ev11.

But freedom rema.lns.&

The commanded good act, for Instance. haa been Int t1ally perce1ved aa a part1cular means which 1s necessary In v1ew of the
necesBary end of man'. nature.'
DetermInatIon, then, in the actIons of an Indetermined
agent -- or moral necessity -- is a matter of fInalIty, of
end.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

•

• • • • • •

5 For a very tine statement of this notion, aee
Ignat1us W. OOlt, Libert!, !!!. '2.!.!. !.!!! Abus,st.. Fordham Prea8, H.
York, 1939, 7 t; alio 7 -3.
6 Walter Farrell, -The Roots ot Obligation-,
Tpomist. I (1939), 22, 24.

!b!
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brought out ln the

COUl'se

01' this present study.

In the followlng chapter we shall begin our study by
laying the gl'oundwork which ls first needed before we can present
a phllosophlcal treatment of Aristotle's notion of obllga.tion.
Thls notion will then be presented in the third chapter.
wl11 be succeeded by a

crltl~e

That

ot Aristotle's position, baaed on

principles 01' Thomistic phl1osophy (Chapter IV). A brief,

Co~

eluding sec tlon wl11 l' ollow.
In beginning our study proper, Chapter II, we shall
first address ourselves to certain preliminary problema .hleb are
essential to this study of obligation.

The first of these is,

quite lOgically, that we establish that Aristotle regarded man aa
somehow subject to some element 01' obligation, regardless of hi.
ab1li ty or lnab1l1 ty to explain this tact.
doctrine of tree wl11 in the

Etn1c~

Then.. the fact of a

calls tor brler attention,

followed by a dlscussion of the good tor man, the end of human

11t. on wh1eb morality must ultimately depend. The chapter w111
conclude by presenting those general prinCiples of Ar1stotelian
philosophy Which under11ne and underlie hi. concept ot obligation
and hence are implicit in It. Aristotle himself did not express
these in the Ethics, but they are the tramework on which the
edifice 1. constructed. hence, they mer1t detailed attention.

CHAPTER II
PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN CONCEPTS FROM

THE NICBOKACBEAN ETHICS PREPARATORY
TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF ARISTOTLE' S
CONCEPT OF OBLIGATION

The concept of obligatlon whloh ls embodied ln tn.
Ethlcs demands an approach slmllar to that of a son approaching
hls father for an advanoe on next week's allowance.

Be does not

Qbroach the toplc directly; he has to ·work up to 1 to. A oertain
groundwork must first be laid.

So it is with the present study_

First of all we have to prepare the ground, to present the seTeral
pregnant concepts from which the ooncept of obligation can be
clearly educed..

We

milS

t "work up to ito.

That is our business

now.
There will be, to course, precious little value to this
entire effort unless it can be demonstrated at the outset that
Aristotle dld regard man a8 subject to some measure of obligation.
Indeed there will be preoious little value to any moral system of
which this 1s not a basic part.

The very fact that such a work

aa the NlchoM.chean Ethics was oomposed at all certainly suggests

10

11
that the author had at least some conception of an element ot
ob11gation in the life of man.

Whether or not this element could

be explained is quite anotner quest1on.

But tne all-pervad1ng

tone ot the tamed treatis. plainly declares that the author des1res to outline a philosophy of lite which man somehow ouget to
tallow.

He surely desires to cut more deeply into the fabric of

moral 11fe than the mere setting forth ot an elaborate system of
etiquette .- a Grecian forerunner to the modern Emily post, whose
decta will doubtless add to the luster of one's social polish,
but scarcely more.
~ought

Somehow, there are things man should do,

to do, and others he ought not to do.
This poInt concerning the very presence ot 80me idea 01

obligation in the Ethics i8 most at all ev1dent when one reads
along through its pages and senses the fundamental att1tude ani....
ating them.

Nevertheless, many particular passages can be

adduc~

to substantiate th1s.
But 1t 1s
bad • • •
when they
1n one ot

by reason of pleasures and. pains that men become
e1 ther the pleasures and pains they ought not or
ought not or as they ought not or by go1ng wrong
the other 81milar ways that may be diat1ngu1shed. 1

Not the mere presence of the term ·ought· along, but the Whole

1 Aristotle, Hichomaahean Ethica, trans. by W. D.
Ross. See the Student's 5ilord lrlstotIe, VOl. V, Ethio8,
Oxford University Pres., lew Yori, 1Q42. This 1. the text used
tbroughou t this study) hereafter 1 t wll1 be referred to merely br
Book and chapter numbers as ••11 as the Bekker number. Quotation
above, II, 3, 1104b 21-24.

12
tone of thos"'e 'fiords "that men become
icant.

!?S-

is considGl"ably signif..

The "bad", oocurlng so commonly in his pages. strikes the

reader as indeed an odd word 1f 80me oharacter of something-lou"
ought-to-av01d- does not attach thereto.

The very idea of -bad-

Is drained of much if not all of 1ts content unless -bad"

for

man signifies something be should not be or should not do -- and.

the reverse, of course, will be said ot the goodl somehow it is
something man should be or do.
the

I

Clearl)", the author ls indloating

trange factor of oughtnels in lite.
Muoh of the same manner of observation can be palsed o!

the following outspoken Une.,
But not every action nor every pal.ion admit. of a mean,
for 80me have names that already imply badness_ e.g. spite,
shamelessness, envy. and 1n the case of actions adult~1,
theft, murder, for allot theae and suchlike things imply
by their names that thel are themselves bad and not the
exce•• 8S or deficiencies of them. It i8 not P08lible, then,
ever to be right w1th regard to them; one must alwaY8 be
wrong ••• Simply to do anJ of th_ i8 to go eong • • • •
Of the actione we have mentioned there is no mean nor any
excel8 and deficiency, but however they are done they are
nong. 2
Can any other impre88ion be gathered trom these 11nel than that
their author was denouncing certain actiona and atate. ot mind
that one ought to avoid'

M.ore than thatJ in this passage Arl.tot

speaks boldll, not heSitating to sal that certain actlonl are

evil intrineically.

If then, this be the lotty moral pinnacle on

It

.,

whlcn he wl11 take hls stand, he is unequivocally implying that
man i8 bound to keep himself clear of these condemned a ets, bound
strlctly, and bound always.
It appears throughout the entire text of the Ethics
that the author wishes to confront hi. readers (or, originally,
perhaps, his awii tors) 111 th the 11nes along which their obliga 1;ione are to be .et.

His doctrine of virtue aa a mean between the

two extreme. ot exce•• and defect implies again and again that tnmiddle state, the virtue, not only is desirable but often i . a
state which cannot be bypassed wl thout blame accruing to the
errant person tor talllng ln an obligatlon. Z
In treating ot the virtue ot temperance hi. uM&r1ying
notions of obligation again shine through.
A. the child .hould live according to the direction of
hi. tutor. 80 the appetitive element should 11ve aocording
to rational princ1ple. Bence the appetitive element in a
temperate man should harmoni!i with the rational principle,
tor the noble 1s the mark at which both aim, and the temperate man craves tor the things he ought, as he ought, and
wben he ought; and this is what rational principle directs.
~he

temperate man, then, is the one whose desires have been made

to harmonize, and not to conflict, w1 th the dietates ot his
reason.

Yet, qu1te apparently to everyonets own experience and

to Ar1stotle's as well, not all men possess this harmonr within
3 ot. II, 9110gb 20-26. '!'he doc trine of the mean
is in Book II, and oona!stentlr throughout the Eth1cs.
"

III.. 12 '" 1110b 1 L-Qn ..
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Thus 1 t can be seen that this moral harmony ls not

themselves.

inevitable in man, not spontaneous, not something automatic -but it is nonetheless the state of
to hold himself.

obar~cter

in which he ought

He ought to be temperate.

'rhe comments on temperance could be repeated relative

to all the vlrtu•• although certainly the obligation involved
will not be identical in ever,. virtue.

Bowever, it will be worth

whlle to inspect also hls treatment of that fundamental virtue,
justice. 5

Of what possible utillty 18 a discus.lon of Juatlce

if there be not something which I owe to another'

This, then, is what the Just 1•• - the proportional, the un
Juet 1. what v~te. the proportion. Renee one term beco. .
too great, the other too small, as 1ndeed happens 1n practice, for the man who acts unjustly has too much and the
man who 1s unjustly treated too lIttle, of what is good. 6
The above prompts the query. how are you to say that

-

-

anyone has "too much" or "too little" unless you have some initlal concept that somehow there 1. an amount that the one in
question properly has, ougnt to have, and the superfluity become.
a point of injustice by going beyond this (implying, of course,
that in injustioe a superfluity means a .1multaneoua deprivation

ot what 1. owing to another person!
1. simply not just1ce.

5

Bk V.

6

V, 3. 1131b 16-20.

Just1ce without obligation

15
It has already been noted that Aristotle holds that
certain actions are evil intrinsically.7

In this matter of

justice he consistently deolares tha.t there are some actions
which can be described. as intrinsically good -- he takes the term
natural justice.
Of poll tical Jus tice part i . natural, part legal• •- na tur
that which everywhere bas the .ame foroe and does not exist
by peoplets think1ng this or that; • • • there i . something that 1s just even by nature • • • The things which Ill'
Just not by nature but by human enactment are not ever,...

where the same. since constitutions also are not the same,
though there is but one which is everywhere by nature the
best.S

He is telling his r cader that according to man's set. established
~ture

ed.

there are ways in which h. will always f1nd himaelt oblig-

Bow can this be

applied'

80'

When exactly i. this doctrine to be

Is he able to explain itt

at this point.

These are not tne questione

We are now only interested in ascertaining the

simple fact that Aristotle did recognize oblIgatIon as a part
(necessarIly a basic part) of moral life.

-- At a later point

will be taken up his vastly significant concept of the end of
human 11fe, and then we establish from that concept the degree ot
binding power which the end wield8 within the loul of man.

For

now, the mere fact of some obligation suffices.
On the specific point under disoussion it is even more

7 See above, page 12.

e

V, 0, 1134b 16 - 1135a 4.

16
ddifficult to find the noted students of Aristotle, the scholars
who tine-comb hil works and gravely unfold to us their inner

meanings -- to find them speaking explic1tly of the element of
ob11gation in his ethical work.

Rather, the,. reasonably follow hi

own example and simply take the whole matter for granted.

Aris-

totle is dealing w1 th some degree ot obligation here .- how else

are .e to explain the work!
.entiment 01' his scholars.

'fhis appears to be the common
Of course, a om. few do comment on the

character or quality of hi. concept of obligation, but that will
take our attention in a later section ot this study.

In this presont section expounding certain concepts
from the

~~hics

which are essential as groundwork tor an under-

standing of his obligation, it wauld be well to point out next a
few of the comments the great philosopher himself has passed on
liberty of the w111.
d1fficulty.

His general position on this poses little

Again, controversy may enter in determining details,

even important details, in his dootrine, but the main fact stands
untouched.
On the whole, than. Aristotle is neither a deterl11n1st nor
a libertarian. It 18 hard to know how l11U.oh to stre•• his
view tba t there i8 a real indeterminacy in things-.he had
not full insight into the problem--but &t his best he in.terprets freedom as self determination.

9 G. R. G. MUre, Aristotle, Oxford University press,
New York, 1932, 149.

--1'1

The text of the Ethics bas manl, very many, pasaage.
presumlng a doctrlne ot tree wl11.

Moreover, such a doctrine ls

only oonsistent with the taot of obllgatlon as discussed above.
Dutl wlthout free wl11 is a squared-oircle, morally.

For example,

there ls an extended dlscusslonlO treatlng tbe 41stinctlon h.
wlshes to plaoe betw.en the ·voluntar,.- and. the "Involuntarl" ..
tollowed by an exposl tlon of cholce.

However, 1 t ls necessary to

note that hls ueage of "voluntary" 1s 80mewhat ambiguous .. tor It
1. more oommonly used among philosophers to slgnify the quaIl ty oj
an act as merely flowlng from the volltlonal faoulty but not necessarl1y 1mplying the further note ot tree operatlon or selfdeterminat10n.

Revertheless In thls section he uses the term.

with the further slgniflcance of aelt-determination, as Is clear
from the context 8ince, for example, in the tollowing, ·pralse
and blame" are not bestowed on mere wlll aots simply because of

their psychological oharacter as such, but rather 'because thel art
ellcited freely.
Sinee vlrtue 18 conoerned w 1 th passions and actions, and on
voluntarl pUlloM and actlons pra1se and blame are bestowed, on those tbat are Involuntary pardon, and 80metlmea alae
pi tl, to dis tlnguish the voluntary and the involuntarJ 1s
presumably nece.8arl for those who are 8 tudylng the nature (
of virtue, and useful alao for leg1slators with alIia to
the assigning both of honours and of punishments.
The study of the -voluntary- would hardly be of use to legialators
$

1

10

tIl, 1-5

11

T1'1'

1

l ' nQ'h

!Iln..~
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unle.s the term 1s here taken to refer to the wll1 when 1 t 1s
selt.determining, 1.e. tree. -- The whole. $Ot10n is replete w1 th
open .tatements grounded on a doctrine of tree w111, of whlch
the following i. only typlcal (displaying, however, the same usas
of

It

vOluntarylt ) I
The end, then, being what .e wlsh for, the means what w.
delibert\te about and chooae, a etlons concerning means must
be according to choice and voluntary. Now the exerclse ot
the virtue also is ln our own power and 80 too vice. For
where 1t 1a ln our poweilto act it Ia a180 in our power not
to act, and vice veraa.

Very convenlently for the preaent studl he goes on to tle ln the
connectlon which thls doctrlne has with the responsib1l1ty 1ncurr
8d by fal1ure to do What we ought to have done and could have do
And we punish tho8 e who are 19norant of anything in the
law8 that they ought to know and that 1s not dlfflcult, and

so too ln the case of anythlng else that they are thought t
be 19norant of through carelessness; we asewne that it 1. i
their power not to be 19norant, ainoe they have the power
ot tak1ng oare.
But perhaps a man is the klnd of man not to take oare.
Stl1l they are themselves by their slack 11vea responsible
for beooming men of that k1nd, and men make isemselves responsible for being unjust or self-indulgent.
If a person 1s to be held re.ponsible for what he does
and What he does not, three conditions must be fulf1lled. (1) he
must not be acting under compulsion, (2) he must have 80me knowl-

edge of the circumstanoe., and (3) it must be performed by

12

III, 5, U13b 3-8.

13 III, 5, lll3b 34-1114a 5.
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cholce. 14 These imply a tree will, some moral awareness or
sensitivity, deliberation, and, of course, choice.
It is interesting to note in passing that Aristotle
pushed his doctrine of free will and consequent respo118ibili ty
to the very extremes of hwnanl1fel
On aome actions praIse indeed is not bestowed, but pardon
is,. when one does What he ought not under pressure which
overstrains human nature and which no one could withstand.
But some acts, perhaps, we cannot be forced to do, but oughi
rather to tace death after the most tearful sutterings.15
H1s pOSition on the basic tact 01' obligation and tree
will, set down in the preoeding pages, is ind1cated in the tollow.
ing.
thus Aristotle holds a man to be responsible for his ignorance of general principles and tor non-application or temporary obscuration 01' princIples of good oonduot; • • • Thu.
a man. is responsIble tor mistakes done under the Influence
of drink or passion, because it is possible tor him not to
paes into suoh states, similarly, he is responsible for
acts which result trom his vicious character; those acts
alone are called involuntary in wh1Qh the agent's charaot~ is not the cause of the act. le
Man has freedom of will; he is responsible tor his choices be-

oause of his treedom.

Be is blamed tor some choices, praised for

others beoause men 1n general real1ze that hIs liberty Is not
mere unbounded license, but 1s clearly faced with actions he
14 III,. 0 1, 2.
15 III, 1, 1110a 24-28.
16 E. E. &picer, Aristotle·s Conception
UniversIty of London Pres,. London 1934. 164.

ou~

2! ~ Soul.
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to elect.
On the existenoe ot a doctrine of tree will in Aristotle the noted scholar, Ross, comments:
It has otten been complained that the psychology of Plato
and Ar1stotle haa no distinct conception ot the will.
Ar1stotle's dootrine ot ~hoic. is clearly an attempt to
tormulate suan a conception. Some of the features of his
doctrinellfe a great advance on any previous thought on the
SUbject.
.

on the whole we must S8.y that he shared the plain man's be
in free wl11 but that he dld not examine the problem very
thoroUghl!A and did not express bimse1f with perfect conaistency_
Although he was one
the long history

of

01

the paramount metaphysiclans in

philosophy. nevertheless it was only in some-

hat later times that the metaphysical difficulties 1n certain
cruclal doctrines such as the freedom of the will were perceived,
opened,

and

probed.

Aristotle presupposes quite aribtrarily the lreedom of the
will and attempts to prove it by the tact that virtue 1s
voluntary and that we are universally beld aocountable tor
our act10ns • • • • We lind in Aristotle no oloset" examinati0l1l of the internal processes which result 1n a.cts ot
"ill fer into the possibillty and limits of freedom of the
11111.
By way of brler summary, then, 1 t is to be considered

17 W. D. RO •• , Ar1stotle, Methuen. 00_# London, 1937,

of Greek
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that the Ethics preaents clear textual evidence that its author
recognized human nature as somehow an obliged nature, regardless
of whether or not the Ethics advancea any explanat10n of th1s
baalc tact.

Secondly, his doctrine of free will is patent in its

.fundamental assertion -- and it is indispensable if man i8 to hay
any true moral lite and not merely a phYSical. animal existenoe.
Jr.e w111 and obligation are companions inevitably • • - The present study, however. has obligat10n tor ita fooal point.
Moving on, then, anoth$%' pOint of great importanoe In
the Ethics and in the questlon ot obligatlon 1s the end ot human
llte.

This reoeives ita prlmary importance from the tact that on

must first of all see the author's view of human 11fe Ingeneral,
and its broad outlIne, before he oan reasonably proceed to Investigate any part of It.
When Aristotle decides to inqulre concerning the
fundamental nature of human 11fe, he must flrst d1soover 80me
ethod ot 1nvestigation which will lead him to the heart ot human
llte. to that central polnt from Which all subsequent qUestions
can be answere4.

Sp.eh a method he tlnds 1nc1sively by posing the

roblem, "Wbat i8 the end of human life'"

Th1s. outting to the

subject, seta the standard for an 1ntellectual
tudy of the moral1ty of human conduct.

It is all-important.

nless there be this toleological approach to human 11fe the

22

and ot the stern ftoughtft involved in l t.

In thus commencing his

study ot human life Aristotle followed a ph1losophic
the highest order.

of

in~t1nct

It was to point out a path which Scholastic

ph11osophers still follow; however, 1t has been one of the cardinal aberrations of much modern philosophy to ignore, misoonceive,
or altogether deny the teleological character ot all being.

From

this regrettable situation has flowed much of the chaotic arbitrariness in today's so-called philosophy.
It w111 be .ell briefly to reinforce this basic notion of the
vital importance of the end, or finality, in a study of obligatior.
~ny

necessity is precisely necessary because first some end is

neceasary, and then the means to it receive their character of
neces8ity by simple participation in the neoessity of the end.
This 1s true in physical necessity as well as in moral necessity.
And moral necessity is obligation.
Determination, then, in the actions of an indotermined agent
.- or moral necessity, 1s a matter of finality, of end.
This is not a peculiarity of moral necessity. 1t i8 a oommo~
note of all necessity; the peculiar1ty of moral necessity
18 that 1t 1s exclusively a matter of f1nality, striotly
ruling out the formal, material, and efficient causes as
its sources. As a result of thIs common note of finality
in necessity there is an intimate bond of union in the
necess.i ty of all nature. All the act. in all of nature are
called into being by an end or goal, for actlon in its
essentIal notlon means no more than movement to an end or
possession of an end • • • That man should be subjected to
this universal neo_.ity of nature is demanded by his plaoe
in nature, He 1s not above nature nor below it, he 211 in it
• • • Moral neoesslty, then, like all necessity in nature 1.
closely linked up with the order to an end • • • To state
that this act 1s obligatory is to declare that this aot

23

is necessary in relation to this necessary end. 20
Bence, in an 1nvest1gation of bis concept of obligation it will be
essent1al that, first attention be g1ven to the end which Aristotle set up for human 11te, and so for mora11ty_
At the outset he states that there must be 80me ult1mate goal to l1fe, moreover, this goal, as the ultimate goal, must
also be the ultimate good.
Every art and. every inquiry, and. similarly every action and

pursuit, is thought to aim at aome good) and1br this rea.on
the good has rightly been declared to be that at whe1h all
things aim • • • • If, then, there is aome end of the thing.
we do, which w. desire for its own lake (everything else
'being desired for the sak. of this
and if .. e do not choose
everything for the sake of something else. • •• clearly
this must be the good and the chief good. flill not thll
knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on Ute'

>,

And in dutitul chorus the master's disoiples reply, Dindeed, a

great influence on liteR.

It 1s well to take note of certain

later sections of the book where the author sho... that he is
fully aware of the importance of the end, 1t one is to understand
the moral dbaracter of lite and the ougbtnesa involved therein.

The origin of action -- 1 t. effic1ent, not its final cause
.- i8 oho1ce" and that of ohoice i8 desire and reasoningwtth
end in vie•• This 1. wh7 choice cannot exist lither without
reason and intelleot or without a moral state. 21
20 Farrell, "The Roots of Obligation" 22-4. -- On
f1nali ty as the bond of un10n in neeas8i ty Farreil here c1 tea st.
Thomas, Summa Theol., I.II. 91, 3J 93, 1 at 6, 1, 1 et S.
21

I. 1. 1094& 1-24.

22

'ft, 2, 1139& 31-33.
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or1gninating cau••a of the things that are done
In the end at wh1ch they are aimed,. but the man
been ruined by pleasure or pa1n forthwith fails to
such orig1nat1ng cause ...... to se. that for the sake
or because of thle.he ought to choose and do whatchooses and doe •• ~

Now, the chie!' good must be finalJ it must be somethlng
_ought for its own sake, and. not as a means to something other. It
~s

an object of choice in 1tself for ltself.
Now such a thing as happlness, above all else, is held to b~
for this we choose always for ltself and never tor the sake
of something else, but honour, pleasure. reason, and ever.,
virtue we choose indeed tor th~selves (for If nothing re.
sulted from them we should atill choose each of them), but
we choose them also for the sake of happiness • • • •
Happiness • • • no one chooses for the sake Qf these, nor,
in general, for anyth1ng other than itself. 24

~app1ne'8,

the supreme good. the ult1mate endS

But thl. fails to

••ttl. the problem in our minds, for spontaneously a second bobs
~o

the surface. What 1s happlnes.,

It appears that the phllos-

ppher'. work, 11ke the proverbial housewlfe's, 1s never done.
What is happinesa'
~ght

perhaps be glven, if we could first ascertain the function

pt man.llaS What does man do

Ph.
~o

In what does it cOlwistt -'hi.

a8

man' What 1s hls proper function!

to be sure, he does many things, but what does he specificall,.
that sets him apart trom other belngs, from other liv1ng

23

VI. 5, 1104b 16-19.

24

I , ' , 1097b 1.7, also X, 6, 1l76b $2.

25 I, 7, l097b,

a4.
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.,

things'

Can I evaluate the etforts of a sculptor, 8a1, it I do

not first know What it is that a sculptor does!

Can I distinguish

the divlng champion trom orude beginners unless I tlr,t know what

a diver does and aims to do, as a diver!
line of reasoning Arlstotle pursues.

Hardly.

And such i8 the

What does man do, as mant

Since nutrition and growth and senaation are elements

at life Which man shares commonly with plant and aiimal 11fe,
only the rational principle remaina by w111ch we may distinguish
the human from the non-human.

If happiness ia man'a chlef good,

then it will som.how pertain to that which is peculiar to man, to
hi' rational prinCiple, to

l'

eason.

Reason is

man',

specific

perteotion <and his specific funotion will flow from that _. i.e.
be determined by his speoifio pertection).

uReason is the best

thing in us tt • 26
A man is said to have or not to have self-control according
aa his reason has or has not the oontrol, on the assumption
that this is the man himselfJ and the things men have done
on a rational principle are thought most properly their own
acta and voluntary acts. That this i8 the ~ himself, ther.
or is so more than anything else, is plain.
We are now prepared to accept a fullor desoription of
happiness.
by

It i8 a state which is attained by and oharaoterized

the praotioe of Virtue, virtue i8 a state of oharacter 28 (and

also ita proper exercise) in accordanoe with man's specific

26

27

28

X. 7, 1177. 20.

IX, 8, 116Sb 33-37
II, 5 • 6 1106& 10) also, 1106& 23.

26

pertection, which is reason.

Hence, rational activity is pro.

duct1ve of virtue and exerc1ses v1rtue; 1t is no less than the
highroad to happinessl

Happiness, life'a crown, "the prize and

end of ~tueftl29
The focus haa become less blurred. yet still it Is
a om'ewha t hazy.

Man has an u 1 tlma t e end and supr em e good. happl-

ne.sJ and the state of happiness i8 reached and marked by vlrtue.
And vlrtue results when man acts accordlng to his specific pertectlon, reason.

But.e Itill have not been told precisely in

what happlness consists.

or

course, we cannot look tor a concept

more sharply focused than the nature of the subject wl11 allo•• 30
But. nevertheless, it se8mS only reasonable to inquire just what
manner of 11fe, day by day, the happy man lives.
Aristotle declares that the happy life is the life ot
contemplation. 3l
But the actlvity of reason, whlch ls oontemplatlve, seems
both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end
beyond itself, and to have its ~leasur. proper to Itself
(and this augments the activity), and the self-sufticlency,
leisureliness, unweariedness (so far a8 this 1$ possible

29

I, 9, l099b 17.

30

I, 3. l094b 11.

31 X, 6, 1176& 30 to 1179a 32. - The relation of
this ARistotelian concept ot contemplation to the Christian
concept ot final beatitude properly lies beyond the Icope of the
pres.nt study but will be g1ven some brief consideration later on.

27

..,

for man). and all the other attributes ascribed to the
supremely happy man are evidently thoae conneoted with this
activity, 1t ollows that this will be the complete happineS8 of man.

3a

Happ1nesl extends, then, just so far as contemplation does,
and those to whom contemplation more tully belongs are more
truly happy, not as a mere ooncomitant but in v1rtue of the
contemplation, for this il 1n 1tself preolous. Happ1ness,
therefore, mus t be some form of contemplatIon. 3S
However, he points out that there w111 be some need for
external prosperity to some degree, need for frIends, wealth, eVel
pleasIng physical appearance.

"Happiness seems to need this sort

of prosper1ty In add1tIon. ft 34

It 11 a dIfficulty for the reader

to decide to what degree theae adjuncts are constItut1ve of
happiness.

perhaps the author hI:mael! did not really know.
It the end of human lite 1s to be realized in conte-

~lation

1 t seems onlJ reuonable that the t'ultther question be

posed, what does man contemplate in this lofty state of lite!
What 1s the objeot of his contemplat1on!

Ross suggests an anawer.

If 1t be asked what Aristotle means, in partIcular, by the
contemplative life, the aNJwer is that he means the contemplat10n of truth In two and perhaps in three departments,
mathematics, metaphysics, and perhaps also natural philosophy_ The happy life is not one of search for t~uth, but
one of contemplation of truth already at tained. 35 It haas
b$en suggested that it 1s, for Aristotle, a life of aesthetic and rel1gioua as well as ot scientific contemplation.

32 X, 7, l177b 18-24.
33

X, S, 117Sb 28-32.

34

I, 5, 1109b 1-9, also X, 8, 1178b 33.

35

Cf. X, 7, 1177& 26.
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There is, however, nothing to show that aesthetic contemplation formed for Aristotle any part of the ldeal 11te • • • •
On the other hand, since the h1ghe!~ branch of oontemplatiol
is called by the name of theology,
it 1s reasonably to
suppose that thls part of the contemplative llfe would have
the charact~ of worship proper to the contemplation of the
41 vine na tur e.:57
It should 'be noted in regard to the foregoing notions
that, tor the most part,

th~

are not explIcitly discussed in the

:F:thicsJ however, they are brietly introduced here tor the sake ot
further specifying the precis e end to which human nature 1s obliS1lIt

Our philosopher sets mants goal on a truly elevated
plane to wHeh the only pathway 1s a steep ascent.

That pathway

is to charted, and cleared, and paved by virtue.

But, moreover J

virtue is more than a mere meansJ it is at least partially con.
stitutive 01' the end itself.

Thus it is important not to overlook

Aristotle's division ot virtue into moral and intellectual. 38
Moral is proper to the w111, to the faculty ot desire. and 1s the
principal means to the end ot lite, happiness.
virtue, on the other hand, is proper to the
is constitutive of the end itsell'.

l'

Intellectual

easoning faoulty and

However, there does not appear

to 'be a basis for drIving this distinction to its extremes; for
regardless of' how he may care to distinguish them, the fact

36

ct.

MetaRhzslcs. VI, 1, 1026a 19.

37 Ross, 234.
initial di.~fnc~~~~: I:r~~, II-VJ intellectual virtue, VI,

29

remalns that'" the means to the end, In the case of happiness, Inevitably partake of the nature of the end itself.

You cannot

arrive at a state of virtue, an end, unless you .first practice the
p8.l'ticular ac ts of virtue whieh lead to that s ts. t ••
The virtues we get by first exercislng them, as also happens
1n the case ot the arts aa well • • • It Is from the same
causes and by the same means that every virtue Is both produced and destroyed • • • Thus 1n on~ word, states of charact~ arise out of 11ke activlties.~V
Similar distinction 1s nlade in rea.'30n according to the
~fferent ends

for which 1t operatesl it is elther practical or

.peculative. 40 It i8 well to note this since the operation of
;reaaon in the practical sense is but a means to the end of 11te,
whereas the operation ot speculative reason is constitutive of the
end.

1~is

18

80

because the object of reason in the praotical

.ensa is that truth which corresponds to right desire, while the
pbject of reason in the speculative sense is truth for its own
not

~ake,

~ls

a mesne to some further end.

8S

Thus, it 1s reason in

latter sense that makes happiness. for it has as its very

~ture

the

n Itself.

cont~lplatlon

ot what i8

necessar~

and eternal. truth

The distinction seen earlier between moral and in-

,el1ectual virtue now as.umes new meaning; moral virtue pertains
~o
~

chOice, and since choice involves deliberation (reasoning with
view to actlon), moral virtue is intrinsically related to

59

II, 1, 1103a 32-1105b 22.

40

VI, 1, 1139& 1-15.
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praotical reason.

These are mean. to happiness.

Intelleotual

virtue perta1ns to truth and falsity, not as related to ohoice or
subsequent act1vity. but only in themselves.

This clearly the

realm of the speculative reason.
What aftirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and
avoidance are in desire, so that since moral virtue is a
state ot character concerned wIth chOice, and choice is
deliberate deSire, theretore both the reasoning must be tru.
and the desire right, if the choice 1s to be good. and the
latter MUst pursue Just what the former asserts. Now this
kind ot intellect and ot truth is practical, ot the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive,
the good and the bad state are truth and talai t1 respectively (tor this is the work of everything intellectual).
while of the part whioh i& practical and intellectual the
good state i8 truth in agreement with right desire • • • •
The work of both the intellectual parts, then.. is truth.
Theretore the states that are most strictly those in respec1
of which each ot these4iarts will reach truth are the virtues ot the two parts.
Once again Ross makes certain illuminating

obaervatio~

whioh prove helpful 1n establishing a somewhat more coherent
alignment of the intertwined concepts of moral and intellectual
v1rtue, happiness and contemplation.
It is clear that contemplation is for Aristotle the
main ingredient in well-beIng (author'. note. 1.e.
happiness), Whether moral action i8 another ingredIent
in it or only a moane to ita production is not so
evident. The dou.bt is not entIre11 removed in Book X•
• • • The part assigned to the moral lite • • • seems
to be twofold. (1) It constitutes a secondary torm
ot well-being, one which we are driven to tall back
upon by the fact that we are not all reason and cannot
live always on the level of the oontemplative life.
And (2) it helps to bring into being the higher kI~.
Aristotle saY8 very little about how it doe8 this.

-

31
Moral vlrtue.. then, 1. Indeed the principal means to the supreme
end ot 11t'e. but it goea on to partiCipate somewhat in the end,
to be a ftsecondery form ot' well beingft (happiness).

It 1s a

roadwa,. that not only leads to the estate but also winds through 1:1 ~
But in a secondar1 de~re. the lite In acoordance wi th the
other kind of virtue (mor,al virtue) is hapP1J tor tbe
l"l
aotivitie. in acoordance with th.is befit our human estate.~
And so It is not ditflotit to understand the statement that
in the Ind.l vidual lite • • • Arlstotle th.ought of moral
action as providing tor the existence of intellectual
activity by keeping in subjection the paaslons. 44
This stud7 has spoken ot' contemplation and ot speeulati ve reason.

I t has been noted above that Ross poInts out that

Aristotle's oontemplation was to center on truth in mathematics,
metaphysioa, and possibly natural phllosophy.4& These, ot' oours.,
are f1elds ot almost boundl6Ss extent.

In certain passagea he

goe. 80 tar a. to say that in enterlng into this state ot' contemplation a man makes himself like the gods.

Let it be a point of

consolation to all philosophers. great and .mall, that Aristotle
h&a deolared them "dearest to the gods-. 46

InCleed, this lite ot

highest reason seems inclined to lift man beyond himself, to

43

X,

e.

U78a 9... 11.

44 Ross" 233:.
45

See page 28 above.

46 X.. 8, 1179& 30. The assertion quoted must have
b.en, ot' course, a considerable boost to the author'. selt-eat.sa

&2

exercise a part of his nature which reaches out to overleap the
bounds of this earthly existence.
But such a lite (of contemplation) would be too high tor
man; for it is not Insofar as he Is man that he will live
so, but insofar as something divine is preaent in him • • •
• If reason is divine, then In oomparison with man, the
lite acoording to it 1s dlvl ne in comparison with human
11te. • •• Wo must, so far as we can, make ourselves
immortal, and strain ~,ery nerve to live In acoordance wlth
the best thIng in us.
Ia this an intlmation, however vel1ed, that another, oontinued
11fe may conceivably awal t man beyond death'
mortal'

Does the end, the goal, 01' life transcend ttli. earthly

career, in his philosophy!

8'

Is man.'s soul im...

Such a view seems highly improbable,

the following suggests.
There mu be a wish even for impossibles, e.g. tor Immortality.
Now death 1s the most terrible of all things, tor 1 t is the
end, and nothing i& thought to be any longer either good or
bad for the dead.'V
And the more he is possealed of virtue in its entirety and

the happier he is, the more he will be pained at the thoughi
of death; for life 1s best worth l1ving for suoh & man, and
he i8 knowingly losing tho greatest goods. and this 1s
painful. 50
In a.nother pa..ssage be indicates further that happiness

18 not pertinent to the dead since happiness 18 an aotivity.51

47

X~

8, 1179& 30.

48 III, 2, l111b 23.
49 III, 7, 1115& 26.
50 III, 9, 1117b U.
51

t ... 10

"nn.

13.

Elsewhere he mentions that

f'rierAs

and country inasmuch as it is better to live a more brief but

nobl~

lite than to preserve one's existence at the cost of rejecting
such noble sacrifice.

But we note that mention whatsoever is mad.

no slightest hint, of any future recompense in a next life for

o~

who acts in thus noble a manner. 52

There seems then l1ttle evidence that Aristotle, despite
his penetrating insight into human life. held a continued existence beyond death.

Had he done

80,

surely it would have most

eonalderabl'1 influenced hiB ethioal thought, giving strength and
aubBtanee in view of an unending end.

lIis Whole theory of ob-

ligation would have been altered.

such was not the case, and

But

his concept of the end. of happiness, of contemplatIon, remain
mundane throughout.
Human 11fe, has, accord1ng to Aristotle, an end to which 1t

tends, as has been seen; and human nature has a goal to which 1 t
is orda1ned.

To know the end of a being 1s already to know very

much' about it; .for soience is knowledge through causes,53 and the
tinal cause is the most basic and determining of the causes~~a

IX, 8. 1169a 17.
53. 1hZ8ica) I, l( 184a 10, Post. Anal., I, 2. 71b 11-15,

52

Ket-Rhlaic.1 , Ot , 2 lo13b 28-S9 ..
54 Physics. II, 3, 196a 24-25, II. 7, 198b 2-5J II, B, 199_
"'1'\
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"
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The end whIch he lays down tor
man is happiness, and this oonsists in man's perteotion. 55 But
cause of the of the other oauses.

sinoe man has many perfections, It ia neoessary that his end be
his specifIc perfeotlon, whioh 1s the full flowering and realIaation of all the potentialities of his distinotive power,
intelligence. A grasp of this'point is essential for an under.
standing of his morality (Aristotle's) in general and of obligation in particular.
The line ot reasoning whioh Aristotle emplo1s is not
something novel which he has devised that he might aptly resolve
the special problems he would encounter 1n moral phiaophy .... aa
though moral phIlosophy were an area apart trom his other thought
It may be distinct but hardly separate.

The Ethics is not a

presentation of new prinoiples, but is fundamentally an
of the

oon~on

applica~

principles of Aristotelian thought.

The teleological character of morality is of vital
importanoe, as was seen above. 56 But why is it that here in the
Ethics he oalls upon a teleological ooncept or principle to reaI

olve the prasant the present problems of the good for man? How
does he decide upon that solution?

Is it a fortuitous guess'

55 See above, pages 25-6.
56
~, ~ti~, _i~

-

See above. page 21. _. Obriatlan and pagan ethic.
~s re~J!8 ct, that both work 11'1 thin a baalcallJ

35

Does he simply happen. upon it?

Clearly, this oould not be the

case.
It is a basl0 princlple of Aristotelian philosophy tba1
the perfeotion of a being is to be found In the realIzation of it.
proper end. 57

The end of eVfSr1.be1ng Is .1mply that 1 t should

beoome fully Itselt, all that i. merely potential in a being
should be, as far a8 posslble, subjected and vanqulshed in the

interest ot the actual.

'l'bi8, then, 1s the being's task, that it

come fully' to be what it .aentially 18.

Its perteotion is to

reallze itaelt, to draw itaelf out, to untold it.elf, to make It.elf be

actu~llx

capacity.

more and more unto the uttermost lImits ot its

This, of course, ls primarily a metaphysical, not a

moral doctrine, rooted as it 1s in the nature of act and potency_
For what i. potenoy but a oapacity tor some perfection not ,-at

had, a pertectlon which is realized tully only in the fullest
possible actualization of that potenoy'

Every potency haa a der.

inIte, positive ordination to its oorresponding aot.

baslc

natur~

It 1s the

ot a potenoy that it is in ordination and decidedly

tends to s omethlng which it 1s not yet.

Its perteotion consists

in becoming that to Which 1 t now only tends.

The pert eotion ot

any being is attained by the reduction ot ita potency to act,

57 This doctrine 18 not explicitly discussed at
length in anyone place in Aristotle, but Is touched on in various plac_, e.g. Metaph381cs. IX (®), a, 1052& 8-;0, and l-Q50b as
.................. - "' ....."0
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more and more and more. 58
When potency and act are studied in the roles of
matter and form, the theory remains unaltered.

Matter is potency,

form it! act.

Matter is the element to be determined, form, the

determininG_

J.nd the perfactio:n of the b ~ing resides in the full ..

eat possible realization or actualisation of its form.

In moral

philosophy, the project 1s to apply these principles to man and
his moral career.
It • • • we take an object and abstract from it everything
that i . merely rud1mentary and only on its way to oompletioJ
and if we think of' the end of its growth as fully .. ·ttained,
obtain the pure and complete realization of its con.ception, to mlich nothing formless, no matter that is still
unformed, any longer attaches. The form, or intelligible
essence of a thing, corresponds wi th its perfect realization, and torm in general with ac~~ality.59

w.

It is implioit in the foregoing observations that the
form. is not formal cause only, but also final oausel

The end 01' ,

being 1s immanent, indwelling. in the being itself, i.e. in the
being's form.
1s,

80

A

beir~

achieves its end in proportion as its form

to spenk, manifested and realized.

Thi3 1s a doctrine of

fundaments.l importance here, that "the rJature is the ond or 'that

for the sake of which t ".60

In the Physics, developing his phil-

••

58 Me,t8.phls~oa, IX (67), 8, 104gb 4 - 1050b 2.
348.

59

Zeller, Aristotle and the Ear11er

Per12atetica~

I,

rfh1a excellent chipter provm."""i5'umant 'references to-all

Aristotelian works in whien his metaphysical thought is found.
60

phvsica .. II

a

194.8. 2'1.32
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oaoph7 of nature and ask1ng 1f nature Bets for an end, he statesl
Now the principles wh1ch oause mot1on in a physical way are
two, of whlch one Is not physloal, as It has no prlnclple o.
motion in 1 tsel!. Of thIs kind 1s whatever causea movement, not being moved, such a. (1) that which is completely
unchangeable, the primary reality, and (2) the eaBnce of
that whlch 18 eoming to be, i.e. tne {arm, tor thls 1s the
end or t that tor the. ake ot which•• 6

A passage frequently cited on this point is in the
where he 1. apealdng ot the need for g1 vine; all the

Me~aphl8108

causes when one inquires into the cause of somethlng.
as his example, he says, "The formal cause'
tlnal cause?

.2!!

~

Bis end.

Gen•• atlon

TJsIng rnan

Ris essence.

The

'But perhaps the latt3l" two are the sam.,e~

2! AP,1mals

speaks of the tour causes and, in

reference to the final and formal causes (the latter of whieh 1.
called. "the definitlon ot 1ts essence") he remarks that "these
two we may regard pretty much

8.8

one and the same."63

time he tells us that one may coneider "nature

88

Another

es.ence inolud-

Ing both the motor cause and the final cause."64

Another interestIng passage on this same point 1s to

b~

found In the Poll
tics.
r*
,
t

And the nature of a th1ng is Its end. For what each thing
18 when fully daveloped l .e call its nature whether we are

-

Ibl~!,

62

II, 7, 198b 1 ... 3.
Me taphl81 0., VIII. 4, 1044& 35-37.

63

Gen. A.1l,1mala, I. 1 .. 715a 3-5.

64

par;ts

61

2!. An1mal..

I, 1, 64la 27.
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speaking of a man. a horse, or a family. Besides, the fina
cause and end 01' a thing is ~he best, and to be aelt-sufflcing ia the end and the beat. 5
Commenting on the doctrine, Zeller f()rmulat.s a precis e e tatament
of it,
The torm is not merely the concept and the essence ot each
thing but alao 1t8 final end and the torce which realizes
this end. 66
.
It we ask how the torm i8 perfected in man the only
reply i8 that it is the whole tenor the Ethics that the virtue.
bring about the pertection of the torm.

The virtue is a habit, a

.table accidental quallty" inhering in the substance and pertecting lt, the rational soul.

·We ••• are made perfect by hablt"51

by habIts dellberately formed, not by some spontaneous process of

In the

case ot man, then, it w111 be all-lmportant to

establish what his torm is, for in ascertaining this the tollow.'
ins shall have been, so to speak, isolatedl (1) his essence, (2)
the source and subject

ot his pertection,

and (3) the tinal cause

ot his existence in general and hi. moral lite in particularl
In viewing Aristotl.'. phIlosophical procedure at

65

Politic •• I, 2, 1252b 30-35.

66 Zel!er, OI.1tl1nftls, 175. Zeller tranalatea the
Greek It.pecle." (e fd()~) U "ooncept", andOlltrlo:..a " •• senoe tt which
can also be tranalated .s subatanoe.
S"!

TT

1

1,

n.~11

gA
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discovering the supreme good and the end tor man, it was seen tha.
he found it necessary to determine what a man, .a man, does, and
what his specific perfection and function is.

Having eliminated

nutrition, growth, and senae perception because held in common
with sub-human forms of life, he goes on to establish that the
human soul, a rational principle, i8 man'a distinguishing pertection, and his function .. man is that activIty of soul proper
consequent upon the same ratIonal prInciple. 6S Thus the .oul,
rational principle, stands forth as the form, the actual, the
determining element inhuman nature.
In analyaing conoeptions into their two elements,
Aristotle attributes to the genus an signifioance the aame
matter, while he identifies the specific difference
wi th the form. Similarly in the scheme ot the un! vera., in
physialog't in zoology, in pyschology, • • • the soul and
the body,
the male and the female, the active and the
passive reasant stand to one another in the aame relation
a8 the form ana the matter. The same i8 true it need
hardly be remarked, of potentialIty and actuality.7o
Realon i. the true e88 ence of man. 71 The lite ot man,

a.

theretore, centera about reason; it i. hi. crucial capacity .-

all el.e depends on how well and to what degree reason 1s
realizedl

and otten.

68 I, 7, 1097b 22-10988 18.
69 B!Anima, II, 1, 4l2b 9 sq c., 414& 13 11,2, sq
70

Zeller~

Ali"tot,le

71 Zeller, II, 143.

.!!!t ~ Earlier

PeripatetiC'. I.

In the ca•• of man It is well to point out that
although the soul 1s form ...... and therefore - .... actuallty ...... at the

ll.!!:!l

same time, 1n some respeot,

potentiality.

~

sa1d

19. !?! !!!s.!. matter,

Properly, of course, it 1s not matter.

But this

manner of speaking is of some convenience when one notes that the
rational being has the task, so to speak, of developing Itself
rationally.

It 1. now rational by nature, but it. pertection will

be realized only if it employs its faculties In activities acoord.
ing to the dIrectIves issued

by

the rational prInciple.

Thus,

tram one aspect the soul is seen in its proper role a. form; from
another aspect 1ts role exhibits some similarIty to matter.
is a natural dual! ty -- it

80

1 t may be truly termed -- and in no

wise contradlctory. for the two a.peets are clearly
tur.

ThIs

complemen~

This dualism 1n the moral sphere of the soul's 11te Is in

k.eplng with Arlstotle's basic doctrine of act and potency_
Potency means (1) a source of movement or change, which 11
in another thing than the thing moved 2t!!!.!:!!! same thi98
.9!!. other.72
.
A potency of being acted on, 1.e. the originative source,
in the very thing acted on, or Its being passlvely changed
by 'another thing or by 1 t8.~lr .m:!.other" ...... 'rhese are In
keeplng wlth the doctrine. 7S
For in all that man doe. it

72

1_. ultimatel"

hi. own good that he

Metaphyslos. V (4), 1019& 15; Italics not in 01'1&

73 Ibld., IX (®) 1, 1046a 12. ...... All thl. provides
excellent exemplIFlcat10n that Aristotle's moral phIlosophy ls
firmly founded in hl, metaphysics.
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baa in mind, happines. in one form or other.

Thus, in all that h

does he 1s, in a oertain sense, both agent and reo1pient.
Ar1stotle's ethioal thought 1s indebted to his metaphysioal prinoiples for its tou.ndation.

Human nature has ce%'tain

peculiarities of its own; but, ,albeit human, it Is atill nature
and fundamentally is subject to the same principles aa the rest

of nature.
cH~ive

To the philosopher,. then, the problem is not to con-

a new set of principles but rather to

established.

8

pply those already

This is what we are witnessing here.

In the famed

!!!. Anima.

he applies his metaphysical

principles to psychological problema, on the app11cations and
solu t.iona thus formulated much of his ethical thought depends.
it 1s, of oourse, in the applications that the produotivity and
profundity of the principles 1s revealed.
Aristotle in his scientifio account of the soul does not
g1 ve any defin1 te s ta tement abou t the good for man. Nevertheless, from his psychological princ1ples , it is possible
to trace certain linea of thought whioh wiJ.l influence the
development of an ethical theory. The chief principles in
the De
which will affect the account ot the good are,
(1) the
eory ot the unity ot body and soul, (2) the
conoeption of the soul as the tinal caus., the purpose and
the end ot man, (3) the nature ot the human soul .a inoluding a plant and animal soul, but at the aame t1me alter1ng
this so that it becomes a untfied rational soul) and (4)
the analysi. of motion and action • • • These lead up to
the conception of the good for man as an activity at the
soul in accordance wi th virtue.'74

AilDlfl

74 Spioer, 137.
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It has been pointed out that Aristotelian principles
present the form as the final cause.

When applied to man the

roaul t then is that tho soul will provIde the end of man's speeif..
ically human actIvity; the good for man will consist in the developing or perfecting of his soul.

The supreme good of the soul

will be the supreme good and ultimate end for man.
Furthermore, man has but one soul although this one
includes several functions.

Among the lower functions are those

which man has in common with sub-human life, nutrition, growth,
perception; the function ot reason surpasses and crowns all
these.
one.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the soul remains
Therefore, among these functions there exists a hierarchy

in whICh the lower must be subordinate to the higher, and the
supreme good will consist in whatever is best for the highest of
the varied functions.

Moreover, harmony will be achieved only if

this principle be adopted even as guide in the moat practical
affairs ot

ev~ay

reasonable action!

living, the r1ght action w111 ever be the
Appetite has a master to whoso domination it

should be submitted r1gorously.75

The w111 may be tree, and is

so, but it owes obed1enoe to the higher <and highest) faculty,
reason, as all in nature which 1s lower 18 dominated by what is
h1gher.

Thus, we can well understand why Aristotle holds that the

75 III, 12, 1119b 14-20; ot page 13 aboveJ also IX, 8,
1169b 33-37; of page 25 above.
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bad man cannot but be subject to interior unrest, contlcit, and
struggle.

He speaks of "the man who has been ruined by pleasure

or patn",76 and as a result no longer even knows what the end of
life is.

The proper harmony has been broken.

been usurped.

Reason's role has

He goes so rar as to declare that vice will "de_

stroy the first principle" in a· man, i,e"

blind him utter11 to

the true nature and end of life. 7 '1
The 1ncontinent man, knowing what he d06S to be bad, does 1t
as a result ot passion, While the continent man, knowing
that his appeti tea are bad, refuses on account of hls
rational principle to tallow them. 7S
~he

interior hierarchy 18 all-important In his moral philosophy,

~the superior principle is to be obeyed, just "as the child should

live according to the direct10n of his tutor".79 This is lunda~.ntal

in the Ethios.

The bad man is said to be full of all kinds of 1nternal
d1ssention, and Aristotle plainly cons1ders that even the
ver1 wicked have a constant inner struggle. SO
Further doctrinal relationships between the Ethics

-

and the De Anima indioate that his moral philosophy was intim-

lately related to his broad philosophy of nature.

Hence, it wl11

76

Vl, 7, 1140b 18; also, cf VII, 6, 11'9b 25-1150. 8.

77
7B

VII,B, 1151a 15, also, of IX,4, 1166a 13-1188b 19.
VII, 1, 114Gb 12-15.

79

III, 12, 1119b; also 1168b 33-37 quoted above p 25.

BOA.A.X.Grlftin, Aristotle's

,,1111ama and Norgate Ltd., LoMan, 10!1,

PSiCh010~1

l~S.

of Conduot,

-
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seen presently that obligation 1s founded on being, on man's

~a81c

nature, as Spicer notes very neatly:
In this general account of the nature of the good 1t
is possible to trace the in!luence of the De Anima. Happiness does not consist in what a man has or-recelves, but 1n
what be 1s and does. Aristotle gives a new meaning to
eudaimonia, and showl that it i8 not a oondition of passivity but an active function. This ia in harmony with his
theory in the De Anima, that it 1s in activity that a
function flnds-rts true meaning • • • • But the Ethics adds
new worth to the conoeption of the soul as developea in the
De Anima. It shows that man is not only a rational being,
'bUt als'o a moral agent who 1s capable of ordering his own
way of livinef)land who has in him the power to a ppreclate
moral values.

Ethical thought, then, folloW8 the pr1nciples of metaphysical and
p8ychological thought.
still problems of being.

Problems of morality are fundamentally
And man is part of nature: the laws

which govern his existence and activity, even into the unique
realm of the "ought" in his nature, willbe only the same laws
IWhich regulate the rest of nature.
Man, like all the rest of nature, is oocupied with the
effort to achleve~2defend and sustain the torm which is the
law of his being.
Virtue acoording to Aristotle haa its roots in nature • • •
The excellence of 11fe which morallty sseks ls • • •
founded on the very essence of our being. Yihatever is
unnatural 1n human lite and oonduct is, in fact, ev11, and
whatever 1Aasenu1nely good 18 in conformity with human
character.

81 Sp1cer, 145-6.
82 John L. Stocks, Aristote1ianism, Longmans, Green
and Co., New York, 1927, SO.
8Z John M. Warbeke, The Searching Mlnd of Greece,
Crofts and Co., New York, 19~1, ~.
--
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With our baokground material thus presented, the
Pocus of the present study may now come to center directly on·
!\.ristotle's concept of obligation itself.

CHAPTER III
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF
OBLIGATION I I THE ETHICS
Now that the way has 'been prepared, the analysis of the
concept of obligatIon which has been embodied in the Nichomachean
Ethics. reflecting the mind of its immortal author, can be
taken.

It will bear repetition that this concept is only

unde~
l~liciJ

in the EthiCS, it is not atated outright, not discussed, not proven, not in any way analyzed.

It is \aken for granted.

Aristotle

seems not to have regarded 1t as a problem at all-·he verr probably oonsidered that merality. with its rightness and wrongness
and obllgatorr element, i. a8 natural, a8 utterly 1nevltable to
man as the ...e'l!1 lit. ot his body.

"It you wish to ohallenge your

own 11vely existence,· he might well say, "then that is your conoem, and your ettorts will soon be oiroumstanced with the peace

ot an institution cell in whioh abundant leisure will facilitate
lOur ecoentrio science.

As for myself, I tind it acceptable as

such) I de.11ne to ohallenge It.

And, equ1valentlJ, I would not

have written such a work as my Ethics
had I felt that its fundar
mental proposition itselt, a moral and obliged life as natural to
man, were open to reasonable 8uapicion."--So the great man proceeded to his worthy task, winning an unending success, acclai.ed
4.6
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by Scholastic luminaries ot medieval time., and subjec'ed to

sch~~

arly analysi. a8 la'e as this 19S0.
Since, then, his line ot thought on obligation i. lett
only impliCit, we must perslst In the approach we have begun,
namely, that of determining jus' what quality and what degree ot
obligation he could consistently predicate ot human oonduct in
view ot the great, main prinoiples of Aristotelian philosopny
which are applied to moral proble.. in the Ethio..
d

u

It ahould tin

ally be noted as well that, as he bimselt lett the matter largely
unaa1d, so hi. varioua scholar. have reasonably done 11kewise tor
the most papt •
• ow man, It 1. obvious, Is part ot nature.

He 1s ao.e-

what ditterent trom that lIte which is pupely animal, Just as the
animal. somewhat difters from the lite of the plant, and so on.

1. subjeot
the
same ele.entarr laws which ••••ntially permeate everything

Bu' man .'ands as par' ot nature; man ls,

80

'0

tha~

i., that haa being.
It haa been s.en that one of the prImary prinoiple. ot
being is that torm i. also tinal cau.e. 1 Since the pational soul
1s 'he torm ot man, It Is the rational soul whioh i. in some wq
hIs end, his tinal goal, aa well.
1 See page 36 above

Happiness then, which a11 agrace
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18 man'. ultimate soal2 , mu.t b., one may 8ar, ratlonallty pert.
ed, It must be the perteot17, completely, supremely reasonable

atate.
~t nature equipa each belng w1 th a torm (and 1 t ls

olearl1 1noonoel vable that 1 t

~ould

oe oihe",l •• ), then at one an

the aame tlme nature a.ta a goal towllfld wb.1oh that belns muat. nee
.aaaril1 tencl.

With the

tON

\he end ls fixed, .et.

It will b.

the or41n&l'1 cour.e ot nature \hat each beingts actlv!t, wl11 neo
.a.arll1 oar17 It along the Un•••et

dOWD

b7 it. veJ!7 nature, .

linea oonduc1ve to the end wb10b acoords wlth and oorreaponda to
tn.

tON. \

'.\'h. Sehol..tlos have

S1 ven thi. truth slmpl. tol'JllUla-

tlon in tbe cla••l0 dlotum, 0l!rat10 !!quitur !s •• , or

'!l1I1_. I....

02~rar\

Thi. 1. the ordin&r1 coun. ot nature J thi. ls

natUJl'al.
\

I When on. comes to man, the .Ituation take. on a new asI

peet.

Han 1s equlpped by natuNI (such 18 the tem acceptable to

thoa. who•• phlloaophy does not include the notlon ot a Creator
"

\.'

~.

/

(

and creation) with the startling, almost anaNhioal power ot w111

tree W111.) Thia, ot cours., tallows upon the endowment ot ratlonal1t7.

4.

2

.

Wlth the liberty ot wll1 goes the pot.ntiallty ot
See page 2S abo.....

.3 S•• page. 17-21 above

4 s••

pas.

24

a'bove, note 22.
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choosing an action, course or actions, or even a whole lire'ime
~hich

tails to bring the person to the end tixed by nature.

For

with his torm as man, goes the oonsequent and utterl,. inevitable
establishment ot an en4 at whiCb mas 1s, so to speak, aimed.
Though he has tree will, man has no choice whatsoever in the end
which 1s consequent upon his very nature. 5 All men have the sam.
nature, c11tterlng onl7 numerloall1.:
f

Consider the situation ot very frequent occurence in
which a man employs his liberty ot choice to elect an action whioll
diverts him from the Gourse leading to his end.

It has &lread7

been noted that Aristotle over and over again terma such an actiol
a,flbad," . .ong, to be avoi484. 6

It it is asked, whf bad? the re-

apons. la, obviousl1, ba4 because it diverts tram the true goal

ot lite.
tion.

And that brings this study squarel,. to a cruCial que.-

is the end ot llte, tor Aristotle, a necessarJ endT

It

there 1. no neoessary end, then there can be no means necessal'T
to the achieving ot that end; tor the means oan be necessary onlJ
by partioipation in the nece.aity ot the end. 7 Is the Ariatoteliu
$
quent page.

~his

point will be developed more tully on a subse-

6 See page 12 above.

7 Ct. MetaE&sics, IV (r), 5. 101$a 20-26 whlrre Aristotle notes that &nJ coniltlons "Without whioh good cannot be or
oome to be, or without which W8 cannot get rid at evil· are ea::I:l8d
ne.ess&l'7. The notion recurs brietlT in the passage immediatelJ
following this quotation.
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-

end an end which man must ohoose or be subject to definitive
olassifioatlon as a failure?

Or is man tree to pursue it or 19-

nore 1t according to hls own de.ire?

Atter all, a8 m&nJ a pagaD

must have argued, what else could tree wlll. have as its purpose
ln man other than to endow him with the liberty at total l1cense.
"tashion your own lite completely. 1t 18 all up to you; nature
bas gi.en you a tree will and in 80 d01ng has ordered you to be
your own master!"
There are two prinoipal anavers to be .et against thes.
notion..

The t1rst i •• tPictly textual:

there is no eY1dence

whatsoe.er in the Ethics that Aristotle looked upon the end ot
human

11te as a subject tor each oneta vh1uy_

Moreo.er. theN

i. oOn8iderable ev1dence directll contradictIng this v1ew, indicating that the end tor man 1. an end tor human nature as such
and hence tor every individual being participating in that nature

Of happiness as tinal. end he comments: "for it is for the sake ot

this that we all do all that we do."8

ins

Here he 18 explicit in say

-

that we aU do our actions tor the sake ot tbis end.--The en-

tire pb.1leoph1cal quest tor the supreme good and final end in the

Ethic. takes
•

to~

granted that the eubject 18 man, not onll some

partioular man or partioular group ot men. Be speaks of the
"good tor man"9 and tne"tunc'1on 01" man. nlO fbi. 11 term1nologJ

8 I,9, 1102& .J
9 I,), l094b 6
10. T . .::

1(\Q'7n'C!
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of

unlv.~sallty.

It should also be noted that the extenaive di8-

ou.slon ot vi:rtue ole.rly implies th.roughout that he is measurine
and classifying habits according to a constant nature fop man on
the one hand, and a constant end tor man, all men, on the other.~
Indeed. wIthout such a fundamental presupposition. a discussion
tbis sort would be the sheerest contusion.
The ••cond reason or anewer vh10h 18 to be given to

~

t.

objections po.ed i. one which has been Indicated previousl1_
Sinoe Arlstotle t • metapby.ics poelta the torm al.o as end. 12 thea
man by vlptue ot hi. torm has a coppe.ponding end .et tor him.
lbi. w111 inevi tab17 be tpue

.et beyond the reach ot

&nJ

tOr!

eaeb and eV8%7 man, a solid taot

whim or ohoice ot hie own devi.ing.

Slnoe mants will, though tree. ie a faculty rooted in the same
801.11 whioh has thla

a1mul~ou.

characte. ot tinal oau•• , it

could not be emplo.red in .uch a manner as to ••t a oleavage wlth1J
the fundamental nature of the being Itselt. Man'. arduous epUtting ot the elusive atom would be a lark oompared to such a metaphJalcal concusslon as thie.
The end 1. an end top all men; it 18 tor human nature
a ••uGh.

Thi8 ls evel"1 man'. loal whether he oare. to add hi.

voluntary oon••nt or not, nature w111 be as little flattered b7

I.
11 Booka 2-6. incl.
"

.a..

-

'8 .... 8 4

"ll..
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hl'll.a

his deoiaion as would be a brilliant prima donna ottered a wIlted
posy tor her mastertul art.

If nature sets man's very being and sets the end at
which he must tend inevitably, then it 18 an inesoapable corrol-

arr

that the taculty ot will ia to be employed in a manner harmo-

nizing and aot contliotins with the nature and the end thus established. 1)

The ele~nt ot obligation thereby appears in the

moral life of man.

Man, as part of nature, though a tree part

80

to speak, ought to uae that fre.dom to tulfill the natural patter
in whioh he finds himself set.

latura haa given a degree ot !Pee

dOlI. to man, but it is not to be considered an irresponsible li-

oense: the treedom In no va,- exil.s man hom the great main pattern ot being and activ1ty and end.
ture,

'~~lt

The freedom, as part of na-

to be used as a cooperat1ng faotor 1n nature, not to

'the oontral"Y. 14

I Man'a phy'sical nature i8 oiroumscribed, permeated whol ,
with laws over which be bas no direct control and only alignt In41r.ct management. l $ Be can never change them. ae cannot orde•
••r

13 Se. page. 40-41 above.
14 ~ Anima. III, 10, esp:. 4J3a 15-32 notes that the

vill, as intelIe.!l.e appetIte, has an tnd intimately related to
the intellect •• end.

1$ He frequently mentlona, (e.g. I,7,1097b 33) that
man'. nature includes the life ot nutrit10n and growth ot the
1 ts
d
i
and er
Ion) but that the rational el...n

a ceasation of the tlow ot blood in bis veins; he cannot command
the

va~ioua

atages or digestion to

occu~

in ditferent sequence

this t1me, just tor variety; he cannot even atop the hair ot bia
head from changing 1 t8 hue I These, and countless others,
with a iSla1cal neceSSity.

p~ogres

They are ineluctable means to contlnu

ing the prooess of lite; they

o~erate

by

physical impuls

nat~al,

e. embo41ed in them, impelling and guiding them. to pertorm the
taska a.signed. to them.
Han"
p.~e.tve

moral nature 18 otherwise.

With reason which can

the good, and a Will whiCh can desire the good Intelle.t

ual17 perceived, man ls lett 'by nature to eleot the mean. condu..
olve to that supreme good peroeptlble to and flOWing trom hi.
rational nature.

fh:i.a 1. hi. obligation. thi. 1. what, in genera

he ought to do.

H1a nature la not in thi. reapect physioally aet

and determined, but nature nonethel.ss retaina a claim to ooopera
tl"., moral (1 ••• teleological) oonduct trom man.

It ls a moral
'1

necosal tiy in him consequent upon the tact that his nature la 1m...
mutably tixed in relation to an end, man's Will ls pat-t ot hia
nature, and 80 18

b~den.d

with the duty ot eleot1ng those aetl0

whioh the Intellect points out

a8

being ooneonant with the man'.

nature and henee with hia ultimate end as well.

But although the

w111 is indeed burdened with this duty, it remains a tree taoultJ
tun4amentall,..

But thi.

duty 18 just aa muoh a part of ita natU%'

aa Its fr.edom 1a't-It will be of passlng

lnte~eat

here to lnspe.
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again certain lines quoted above16 to the etrect that tor Aristotle virtue is rooted in nature and morality is the purposeful
quest for our supreme good and end "founded on the very essence

ot our being."

Prom this it tolloW8 that whatever is truly natur

&1 is good, while evil is the unnatural.
A Christian ethioian bas presented thi. line of though\

admirably in the following linesl
The path ot activity proper and congenial to every being i.
tixed and dictated by the nature which the being pos.es.e ••
The coamic order whioh pe~ade. all the non-human universe
i. predetermined in the natures ot the innumerable variety
ot things whi ch make up the un! verse. Por man, too, the
cour.e of action proper to him is indicated by the constitution ot hi. nature. A great part of his activity 1., like
the entire movements of the non-human world, under the iron
grip of determinism; there are large clas.e. of vital tunctiona over which he has no volItional control; and his bodJ
1. subject to the phJ.lcal laws ot matter. But, unlIke all
the lower world, he 1s h1J1l8elf the master of hi,s actions ov~
a wlde range ot lite which we know a. conduct. ae is treet:
to choo.e betw.en two oppo.lto courses; he can elect, in oir
cumatance. innumerable, to do or not to dOI ••• Does, then,
41. nature turnish no index tor conduct? Ia every form. ot
con4uot equally congeDial and equally indifterent to human
nature., By no meana. Hi. nature indioate. the line of acti0!7Wh10h is proper, and the line which is abhorrent to
it.
Although. the aooye is drawn hom

~

Ohristian source, and agree.

with Aristotle's line ot thought, 1t would be somewhat lesa than
accurate to conclude that the pagan and the Christian conoept ot

16 See above, page 42, note 65, Warbeke.
17 James J. pox.. "DutJ ," Catholic Encyclopedia. Appelton Co., lew York, 1909, 1, vola., t., 216.
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obligation coincide; tor to the Christian (waiving the problem ot
.. Ohristian Ehlloaophl ..s irrelevant here) "nature" 1s a tar more
pregnant term than ever it can be to a pagan.

Por, as will be

indicated at greater length in the concluding ohapter of this
study, the very concept ot nature has a richness and a profund1ty
for the Christian -.bioh the pagan lords at intellect, however
glfted, scarcely suspected..

The very concept of nature, to the

Christian, speaks, implicltly, of the Author of nature, the
supreme Designer and Ordalner.

The Christian does not, of course

hold to a view whlch would have the Creator and Ordainer an
arbltrary pow.r Whose mere whima, even When successively oontra4iotor7, would. find full and permanent expression in the world
abou t

114 ••

for even Iie is bound by the very fundamentals of

metaphysic..

Even Be is,

80

to speak, oompelled to abide b7

the metaphysios ot the universe, of the "nature" Which Be has
fr.ely determined to establish and retain in existence by H1s
abiding ooncurrenoe.

h~en

Be, using the classio example, cannot

square the circle, but, rather. can better be said to be able to
do only those and all those things whioh in themselves are able
to be done. --

Moreover. to the Christian, the rich conoept of

"nature· existing under the dominion of a peraonal Author givea
a far more apec1f10 teleologioal character to all things, including human life and conduct, and obligation.

Aristotle perceived

the teleologioal character of being, and human conduct, but
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In oommenting on the ethical thought of Aristotle
another author haa wrltten:

.an

Arlstotle wished to comprehend motlon, development, becoming
To him, therefore, the essence, and the perfect expression 01
it In the Indivld . ,al, is also the telos, or end. The form 11
thus the eft1cient and the tlnal cause at one and the same
time. Applled to the domaln of ethiCS, however, this means
that pure being or the ;;w,-e easential torm Is 11kewlse the
goal of becomlng tor the man. • • Prom the essentlal belng
results an oughtness for the Indivldual man. In this way,
trom the content of the prlmar,r norm, "strive after the good,
as It appears in the essential form of man. The supreme norm
of morality Is accordingly thls: Reallze your essentlal torm,
your nature. The natural ls the ethical, and the essence is
unchangeable. 18
ought to reallze his essentlal form; he ought to become truly

~d fully natural.
~atlon

Man is plaoed by nature In a verT detinlte re-

to an end; from this relation

ste~

a claim placed upon hls

reason and his tr.e wl11, a olaim that he oonduct himself to the
proper end.

This olalm, indeed, can be Ignored, but still it

.tands, real and objective, Just as a contract violated remains
lonetheless a contraot.1
The same author qi?oted above, Rommen, gives further
nunciation of the metaphTsloal baais of obligation which can be
ere adapted as express1ng tne same notions which underlie Ar1etoelian obllgat10n (in fact, no Thomlst, ot oourse, Is tree of' this
ristotelian influenoe, and Hemmen is Thomistlo).
!he supreme pr1nciple of oughtness is Simply this:

Be 0 ome

18 Heinrloh A. Hommen, The Natural Law, Herder Book Co.,
ft. Louis. 1947. translated bv An·~A H HAn ......... "" .. ,.. .. ,1.

-
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yO\l.1! eas-ential being. For the rational, free nature of man
this signifies: Act in accordance with reason; bring your
essential being to completion; fulfill the order of being
which you confront as a free creature. 19
In a footnote to the immediately foregoing quotation, Rommen
makes his already clear thought more clear.
In other words, man's basic and primary duty is to become
(in fact, actually, fully, completel¥> what he is (in idea,
potentially, germinally! essentially) through the consistent
and persistent use of h s reason and free lOll in the light
and direction of his natural inclinations.
It will be wlse to note once more that the presence of thoughts
herein quoted from a Christian source in no wise indicates the coincidence of complete Aristotelian doctrine on obligation with
complete Scholastic doctrine, but
~h1ch,

rat~er

only that element of it

convenient for these present purposes, does coincide with

~ristotlets

unspoken, implicit position.
It has been seen then that Aristotle is consistent witt

tne great fundamental principles of his philosophy when he presumes that man's nature is an obliged nature.

It would have been

interesting and highly instructive had he undertaken an explicit
exposition and defense of his position, but he simply did not,
and only analytical investigation of the matter can bring his
thought to light.

19 Rommen, 178.
20

ib1d., note 2.

i i
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It Is now establlshed that human nature is an obliged
nature for of the various reasons expounded in the pages preceding, man is obliged to bring about the pertectlon of his rationallty in the fullest degree possible and, in so far as this shall
have been achieved, to that extent ahall man attain that state ot
contemplative living rooted in intelleotual Virtue, and consonant
with moral Virtue, which 1s the ultimate end of human life.
is happlness;

This

to thia, man is ob11ged.

But the turther question immediately suggests itaelf;
:iwhat are the concrete meana which a man must elect to attain this
endf

Does not Aristotle tell us more specifically what a manta

obligations are'

It is as it a .ew Yorker were told merely to go

westwards it he wishes to reach Los Angeles.

"Many thanks," be

migbt well reply, "but could JOu possibly be a little more specifief

I shall need details if my journey is to be a auccess."

a somewhat similar vein. the reader quest10ns Aristotle.

In

But

Aristotle Is aeemingly hesltant; on the general lines of moral!ty
he speaks with aasuranoe--but 1n desoendlng to particulars he frequently urges caution.

fhe student should not expect an exaotness

trom a scienee which exceeds its intrinsic oapac1t1es.
But this must be agreed upon betorehand, that the whole
aocount ot matters ot oonduot must be given in outline and
not precisely, • • • that the acoounts we demand must be in
aooordance with the SUbJect-matter. " •• fhe general aocount
being of this nat~e, the account of particular oas.s is Jet
more lacking in exactnes., for they do not fall under anr
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art or precept but the agents themselves must in eaoh case
conaider what i8 appropriate to the occasIon, as happens
also in the art of medicine or of navigatlon. 2l
On many occasions he speaks aimilarly:
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as muoh olearness
as the subjeot ....matteI· admits of t tor precision is not to be
sought for alike in all discussions • • • • We must be content • • • to indicate the truth roughly and in outline • • •
for it is the mark of an educated man to look for preCision
in eaoh class of things just so far as the nature ot the
subject admits. 22

And tn. reader of the EthiCS, searching for definitive statements
oommitting the author to one or another positlon relative to
sl{ecitlc o'bllgations In human 11fe, comes to realize that Aristotle carrie8 out his own warnings.

Be doe8 not push his study

of the virtues to the point where he is prepared to say to his
reader that this or that ougnt to be done and indeed must be done
if the end of life 1s to be attained.

As Bosa notes, "he nowhere

attempts to deduoe the necesslty of any slngle virtue from the
supreme end to

be

attalned."2)

Zeller makes a somewhat slBdlar

observation,
Seelng that he had inve.tigated the Idea of happiness, and
had found in 'virtue f the essential means thereto, he might
have made an attempt to define the various kinds of activity
which enable us to reach this end, and 80 have sought to
arrive at the maIn kind. of vlrtue. He does, however,
nothing of the kind.24

21 II, 2, 1104&

>,

22

I,

2)

Ross, 204.

5-9.

1094b 11-28.

24 Zeller, PeripatetIos, II, 163.
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It would, however, be incorrect to conolude that the
Ethios affords no olue whatsoever to the mind of its author on
this highly important point.

There are several aspects of the

work which will yield evidence helpful and convenient for the
present inquiry.
First, it is a matter of much significance that Aristotle had some conoept of certain actions being evil intrinsically.25 In some action., he declares, there can be no application
of his doctrine of the mean--they are always to be avoided, and
so, it may then be concluded, here is a definite point of obligation.

Be mentions spite, enV'J, shamelessness, adultery, theft,

murder.
Por all of these and suohlike things • • • are themselves
bad, and not the exoe •• es or defioiencies of the.. It is
not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them;
one must always be wrong. • • • Simply to do any of them is
to go wrong. • • • Of the actions we have mentioned there is
no mean nor any exces, and deficiency, but however they are
done they are wrong. 2b
Se manifests this concept once again when he come to
discuss justice, by pointing out that there i8 a torm ot justice
whioh is "natural".

It is that justIce which

ever,rwhere haa the same force and does not exIst by people's
thinkIng this or that; • • • there is sou~thing that is just
even by nature • • • • The things which are just not by
nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same. 27

25 See above, p:ge. 13, 15-16.
26 II, 6, 1107a 8.25.
27 V, 7, 11)4b 18. • 1135a 4.
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low 1t appears that the only possible basis upon which a dootrine
of "natural justice" oan be founded is a stacle or constant
nature (i.e., human) fixed in its relation to some end which it
~s

morally bound to achieve.

It is nothing subjective, for it

~does

not exist by people's thinking this or that".

~ents

or opinions cannot alter its objective character; therefore,

men are faced with obligation in its regard.

Human senti-

It has "eveP,Jwhere

the same force (as fire burns both here and in Peraia)tI.28

But

the author does not prooeed to favor his readers with specific
examples of obligations arising from natural justice.
~old

He has

us that there are such, but he tails to enter into further

details.

However, reference can here be .ade to another passage

studied above 29 whioh throw~ same l.~)nt on the inquiry at hand.
fhere he tells us that "murder, theft. adultery" are never permissible; man baa a permanent obligation to avoid these under
penalty of failure to aohieve his end.
Nor does goodness or badness with reg::J.rd to such things
depend on oommitting adultery with the right woman, at tne
right time, and)On the right way, but simply to any of them
1s to go wrong.
Aristotle notes turther that
~he

altho~gn

his doctrine ot

mean 1n virtue 18 general17 true there are oases, as 1s now

~leap,

when it is not app11oable--and it 1s espeoiall, 1n these

28 V, 7, ll)4b 27.
29 See note 24 above, page

]0 II, 7, 1107a 15.

a~
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exceptions to his rule that one can discern the major points in
the spedifying of man's detailed obligation.
It would be equally absurd, then, to expeot that in unjust,
oowardly, and voluptuous action there should be a mean, an
excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a
mean ot' excess and of deficiency J an excess of excess, and
a deficiency of defioiency. But. • • there is no excess
and defioienoy of tempera~ce and oourai ! because what is
intermediate is in a sense an extreme.~

In matters of temperance and courage, then, man .faces elections
of importance; for the unjust aotion, the cowardly
~uous

the volup-

actions, are suoh that they are not to be permitted in any

~egree.

They are areas of conduct into whioh a man OUfJ!.t not

trenture.
~o

and

On the contrary, those corresr::.londlng moral virtues are

be developed which are the necessary means ot oarrying man in

~he

opposite directton, i.e., toward that lofty level of specula-

~ive

activity supported by moral virtue which is the end of human

ife.

If these virtues are not pursued and developed, a man's

~haraoter
~issing

suffers accordingly, possibly even to the extent of

the end altogether.
~h1s

suggests a further point 1n the matter of specify-

ng man's obligation, although this deduction also re:ma.1ns gem ...
tral (for that 1s the state in whioh the author himself leave it).
_an must realize that actions develop the oharaoter--like aotions
4

evelop lIke oharacter, and this or that stH.te of oh:lraoter is the

31 II, 7, 1107a 17-2).

principal determinant of human success or failure 1n respect to
the end.

Henee, it is clear that man is under obl1gation to re-

gard certain states of character as proximate ends in life, ends
which, when attained, assume the role of means carryIng man on to
the further, ultimate goal.

The end is no longer 'rQite so remote

and obscure; it has been semewhat particularized by the indioation of prox1mate ends subordinate and subservient to it.

Can

a man, then, attain the end if he does not first of all inolude,
80

to speak, within his charaoter the habit of temperance, of

courage, of justice, of reasonable self-restraint in the face of
pleasure (for these are here selected not at random but from his
own statements on intrinsic evil and natural justice32 ),

It

seems that these are indispensable.
Bow, these virtues which, in turn, give rise to the
indispensable states of ch-racter do not oome to us by n9.ture. 33
Nature endows us only with the potency for them, and for their
oontraries as well, and whioh of the potencies will be actualized
and whioh will rem'dn merely potential is a matter for choi ce on
the p'3.rt of the agent.

Depending upon whl.ch path 1s followed,

whioh quality of acts is ohosen,

8.

corresponding state of oharao-

ter will be developed carrying the agent toward or away trom his
32 See a.bove, pp. 24-25, esp. note as.

-

33 Ibid., II, 1, 1103a, 15-35.
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supreme end.
By doing the acts that we do In our transactions with other
men we become just or unjust. • •• The same is true of
appetites ~,nd feelings of anger; some men become temperate
and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and ir'jsci ble,
by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. thus, 1n one word, states of ch'lracter arise
out of like activities.34

Because of this truth the activities we elect are of vast importanoe in our lives; defin1tely, the necessity of the ultimate end
endows certain of our c101ees with an obligatory quality.
1s important; in fact, he insIsts, it is

This

!!! important.

This is why the activiti68 we exhibit must be of a certain
kind, it is because the states of character correspond to
the diffE>rences between these. It makes no small dif .erenae,
then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from
our very yourth; it sakes a very great difference, or rather
all the differenoe.35
.

t7.

To carry bia dicta into practice is not without

difficul~

Human nature, he recogni zes, does not [, t~pE~ar to possess a

strong tendency to the good life; in fact, it seems almost to
struggle with itself as with some interior enemy.
thus takes on a new sternalis.
means are

necells~ry

Obligation

As the end is necessary,

80

the

(morally, Of course), and now that the means

are seen to be, as it wera, elusive, and diffioult of attainment,
the qu.allty of the ouet involved is intensified.
For exactly as paralysed limbs when we intend to move them
to the right turn on the contrary to the left, 110 is it with

)4

lIt 1, 110)b 5-21.

35 II, 1, 110)b

22-26.
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the soul; the impulses of incontinent people move in contrary directions • • • • We must • • • suppose that in the
soul. .. • there is something contrary ·to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it.36
It may further be considered tha.t the famous Aristoelian doctrine of the mean provides some clue

(admitted~y

qlJite

enaral still) to man's spacii'ic obligations rela.tive to h.'s u1tiate and.

In all things, save for the exceptions of intrinsio

orality already sufficiently noted, it is the middle path which
coords with our rational nature.

Rea.son is the guide, and the

tandard by which reason is to form its deoisions in the agent's

>wn nature; for the mean is something "relative to us."
Virtue, then, is a state of oh::lracter concerned with choice,
lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being
determined by a rational prinoiple, and by that principle by
which the man of' prudence would determine it .37
~eason

will seek out and perceive the mean; it will be for the

rolitional faculty to choose it.

Beca.use of the great importance

1)1' electing virtuous actions so that virtuous character res <..lts,
t may be submitted that here again a re at least the outlines of
~peci1'ic

obligations.
There is a i'urthcl' question whose solution will shed

nor. light upon this Aristotelian concept of Obligation.

Does

I\ristotle account in any way for a consciousness, an awareness,

36 I, I), 1102b 20-25; also see III, 12, ll19b 7-19,
where he notes that ~he irrational elements in human nature give
pise to insatiable appetites which must be sharply curbed.
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within a manfs mind that this action which he is dellberating wil
let us sal. lead him awal trom his ultimate end and pertection?
Certainl, he is not going to require that man tollow a course
which he i8 not able to percelve. This would conflict with hi.

own doctrine that actions are SUbject to the will

and

the will c

only choos. something which is'tirst perceived by the intellect.
Since moral virtue is a state ot character concerned with
choice, and ohoice 1. deliberate desire, theretore both the
reasoning must be true and the desire risht, it the Choice 1
to be good. and the latter desire must pursue just what th
tormer reason assorta.)tt
Choice can only follow reason.

Dail, experience verifie. thia,

tor one cannot choose to attend the theatre
curs to him.

11'

the Idea never oc-

And concerning the ultimate end, it will be impossi

ble of aohievement it the necessary .eana is indistinguishable.
The attainment of the ultimate end surell is not to be a merel,
enanoe aftair, an unforeseen prize tor the tortunate.

The Chris-

tian philosophers have responded to this problem with the discove'1!'f of what thel have teraed consoienoe.
The closest that Aristotle approaches to anl direct sol
ution to this problem is his doctrine on prudence.)9 This is a

38 VI, 2, 1139a 22-25
39 VI, 00 5 and 8.1). The Ross translation us.d in
this studT renders cp,odvn<rls as "practical wisdom". But this 1_
unsatistactory to the Sonolaatic philosopher. WisdaR, striotll
taken, is speoulativea aot praotioal. Ross, ot oours •• i_ not
Scholastic, and us.. practical wi_doa" coa.lstent~. The thoVih
18 more acourate17 oon.e7e4 to Soholaatl. readers b7 "prudence ,
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"true and rea80ned state ot capacity to act with regard to the
things that are good or bad for man."40 It is, then, reason applied to action, "about what is good and expedient for himself,
not in some particular respect, e.g., about what sorts ot thing
conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts ot thing
conduce to the good lite in general."41

Prudence concerna the tOJ~

mation ot decisions pertaining to whatever i8 good tor oneself.
Since it i8 a Virtue, the "good" here must be understood to sign!-

r,y that which is truly good, i.e., conducive to the ultimate goal.
There is further evidenoe tor believing that this serve.
as man'. personal guide and director, informing him ot what he
ought to do, or, on occaSion, what might merely be the better
thing to do.

When Aristotle compares understanding and prudence,

he decide. that the latter goes beyond the tormer in its interior
influence on man's conduct. "For prudence issue. command., since
its end i8 what ought to be done or not to be done; but
ing only Judge •• "42

understand~

This appears to put it in definite relation

to man's obligations, telling him that his good is to be attained
by thea. means, not by other means here and now.

He mentions,

moreover, that in the aotuality there i8 little practical

40 VI, 5, 1l40b 4.
41 VI, 4, 1140a 27.
42 VI, 10, 1143a 8.
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dietlnction between judgment and understanding and prudence and
Intelligence.-all clo.e17 1nteract and even overlap.4J

And "thes4

atatea are thought to be natural endowments."44
It ls Interestlng to note that he relates prudence to
the "work ot man", wh1en leads one to suspect all the more that
the goal ot 11te 1s unattainable without this virtue.

It deter-

mine. what means w111 bring one to the end ot lIte perce1ved b7
"virtue".

Furthermore, in non w&f doe. 1t ooeroe the wIll, but

.ere17 point. out the meana that ouaet to be taken 1t the end i.
to be reached.

In one Instanoe. in a aomewhat otfhand manneI', he

reter. to prudence a. Uinta .,. ot the aoul."4S Be atate., later
on, that there can be nonvlrtue of an." sort that doe. not imp17
and involve thi ••

Socrates • • • in thinking that all the virtue. were torma oj
prudence • • • was wpong, but in .&fing the." implied prudencE
h~ wa.. rIght • • •
Sooratea, then, thought the vIrtu•• were
rule. op rational pplnoiple. (tor he thought the." were, all
ot thea, torma ot acientlfl0 knowledge), whl1e we t hlnk the."
Invo1ve a pational prinoiple. • •• with the preseno'lot th.
one qual1t,. prudenoe, will be glven all the virtuea.4b
Choice will not be right without prudence anr more than wlthout virtue; tor tne one determine. the end and the other

43 VI, 11, 1143a 25-31.

44 VI, 11, 1143b 6 (Italics added).

45 VI, 12, 1144& 29.
46 VI, 13. 1144b 17 - 1145a 2
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mak..

us do the thIngs that lead to the end.47

Be 18, then unwilling to identity ·vlrtue" and prudence although
the7 are intimately related.

If all virtue involves a rational

prinoiple, as he says, it must be true that the underlying ration-

al principle 18 aa a beacon light to Virtue, illumining the safe
and good path to the desired end.
With reason essential to man and constitutive of his
torm (whioh 1s also his end), it is now intelligible how reason
guide. man along those linea of conduot which reason aloae can

pel~

celve and whioh, moreover, reason alone reoognize. as conducive tc
the rational end ot lite.

Aristotle, geniua that he undoubted17

wal, did not alway. express hil ethical (and pS7chological) notlons with caretul, conscioUB preCision.

This would have been ot

great advantage to later ages when certain philosophical problema
dilolosed certain perplexing aspeets not recognized in hi. 4&7However, the evidence is fairly strons, as a.en above, that, tor
him, man t s obligatlona were trul7 binding on man since he waa rendered conscious ot thea D1 prudence.
It i. now an intellectuall, .ecure position that a eoneept ot obligation i8 basic in his moral philosophy.

Furthermore.

It has bean seen that this ooncept Is consistent with the great
fundamental principle. ot hi. entire philosophical structure. and
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that he haa, more by keen instinct than by conscious design, provided tor a rational awareness ot means necessarr and obligatorr
tor the end ot man.

But the further question arises ooncerning

the degr.e ot obligation in mants lite.

How striotl1 is he bound!

Is this obligation absolute, is it a real, inevitable, inexorable
muat
...........

(alwaJ1, ot course, respeoting the tree tacultl ot will),
In response to this it will be necessarr tirst to reoaU

what has been presented earlier in the present chapter ot this
8tu~.48

It was seen there that Aristotle oonceived the ultimate

end ot lite as being the end tor all men, an attair entirely beyond the reach, as it were, ot the human will.

It i. tixed.

It

is tor human nature itselt and no man can be or ever will be exoused.

Rence, the relation ot man to his end is inescapable; the

obligation to attain this absolute end will be an absolute, moral
necessi t l·
But it man'. obligation is a strict, absolute must, i.
it not clearly implied that some punitive evil will betall him
who tails to respect and tollow the dictates ot that must or
ought and so ultimately misses the end'
are maD1 suchpersona.

No one doubts that there

Certainly it is fundamental to a concept

ot obligation that he who tlaunts and ignore. his duty somehow is
made to pay tor his treely chosen error.
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lor Aristotle these questIons cannot be given any full,
t:ruly adequate answer.

The1 push on into areas of life and activ,.

itl where a pagan, however gifted ot intellect, ventures to speak
only with the utmost oaution and reserve, or not at all.
knows nothing of man

f..

For he

origin, and nothing ot a oontinued lite at.

tel' this earthly lite reaohe. 1ts tin1sh.49

Failure, then, tor

him, 1. going to be ot thi8 earth, moreover, 1t will need to appear betore death--tor the good and bad alike die, otten with no
apparent

dirter~ee

in the manner ot the1r departure. Since the

end 18 happine.s, tailure to reaeb. the end must, obviously, ren...
'ide1' the miscreant unhappy in proportion to his tailure to respect

~

his obligationa.

Then too, as briefly seen betore,50 a certain

corruption ot charaoter is said to be visited upon the man who
tails.

Bature •• ems to exact a toll--and certainly man'. univer-

sal experience ot man lends at least some substanoe to this claim.
Aristotle speaks rather vividl,. on thia point.
And tho.e who have done m&nJ terrible deeds and are hated tor
their w1ckedne.8 even shrink from lite and destroy themselvea
And wicked men seek tor people with whom to spend their da,.8,
and shun them.elvest tor the,. remember many a grievous d.ed,
and antiCipate others like tha., when they are b1 themselves,
but when the, are with other. ihe, torget. And having nothtq
lovable in the. they have no teting ot love to ihemaelve ••
Theretore alao .uCh men do not rejoice or grieve with them.elve., tor their soul is rent b7 taction, and one element
in it bJ reason of ita wickedness grieves when it abstains

49 Se. above, page. 30..31.
50 See above, page. 41.. 43.
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trOll oertain aot., while the other part Is pleased, and one

draws them this wal and the other that, as it they were pull"
ing them in pieoea. • • • tor bad men are laden repentence.
Therefore the bad man does not see. to be amicably dl ••
posed even to himaelt, because there Is nothlng in him to
love, 80 that if to be thus i. the height ot wretchedness, W4
ahould strain ever~lnerve to avoid wiokedness and should endeavor to be good.>
It ls not difficult to understand the burden ot this passage, outspoken as it ls.. The wioked are pictured a8 livlng in a state ot
interior, moral chaos wlth .erenlt7 and peace so banished trom
their souls that the,.. no longer love themselves, seeking the associatian ot others tor dlstraotion.
and more than a little true.

The portrayal Is an uglJ one,

It 40es indioate that Aristotle hold

~

~that nature metes out a sort ot sanction to those who have allowe~

their 11ves to devlate tra. the pathw&1s ot thelr known obllgatlem
In summary, it

ma,..

now be detinitel,.. stated that the mor-

al philosophy ot Aristotle does essentiall7 involve the note ot
oblIgation.

He holds to this fact strong17. Having recognized

the taot in his own consciousne.s and in the experiences of his
tellow men, hi. ultimate explanation ot it involves,
~h.

~plicitl7,

great basic princIples ot act and potency, applied to man aa

~atter

and tor...

Man'. pertection and end, then, r83i4•• in the

realization ot hi. essentIal ror.a.

51 IX,

4,

Thi8 18 the determined

cou~se

1166b 12-28; th.~e i8 turther evidenoe ot
a man have not vi~tu•• he i. the mOlt
~o17 and mosE aavage ot animala, and the most full ot lust and
gluttonr." I, 2, 1253a 30-39.
th18 in the Polltic., "it
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proper to human nature, which each person 1. obliged to pursue, ac
cording to the practical dictates of his supreme guide and illumiationt reason.

His obligation thus pertains to those lines of

conduct which, harmonizing with bis rational nature, are indispensable if he is to attain his necessary end, good, and perfection.
With this exposition ot Aristotle's ooncept ot obligat
as manif.sted in the Ethio. now oomplete, it will be profitable t
prooeed in the following (tinal) ohapter to set down an evaluatio
and criticism of this notion so fundamental in all moral philOSOphy.

CHAPTER IV
AX EVALUATION' OF ARISTOTLE'S
CONCEPT OF OBLIGATION II'

THE limO!

In the foregoing pages there has been presented a
detailed study ot the concept ot obligation which Aristotle has
woven into the fabric of his Ethics.
concept.

It

is~

ot course, a pagan

Though lofty in aspiration and penetrating in anal-

lai8,-it remains 8lbJect to those aevere Um1tations whioh must
alwals charaoterize secular thinking in anJ age.

In the present

chapter it will help to set forth an evaluation of the laudable
aspeets ot Aristotle's concept and indicate as its deficiendes.
In 80 dOing, the concept itself will become more sharply defined
and more adequately understood.

The evaluation here presented

will be based not on the au.thoritl ot any particular phIlosopher
but w111 be baaed rather on the cogency of Its own argumentation.
Obviously, however, the writer takes the position of one tormed
in the great Christian tradItion and regarding that ph1losophical
posItion a8 sound and true.

Be recognizes the work ot Aristotle

aa the 80Ud 8tartlng-polnt tor ChrIstian speculatIon, but con8iders the latter to have performed and tar surpassed Its Grecian
beginnings,

"

'15

Tbe major criticism to be leveled at Aristotle hare is
e charge ot incompleteness.

This ditfers clearly f'ltom a tar more

serious charge of incorrectness or falsitYf

Generally, he 18 not

wrong, rather, he has failed to state the whole truth.

The pres-

ent chapter will attempt to indicate this in SOMe detail.
First it will be well to draw the outlines of a distlnction wh1ch will be valuable here,

The d1stinction is placed

between a general concept and the further specification of that
s&me concept,

Thls resembles the familiar distinction between a

prInciple and the app11cation of the princ1ple, The general
conoept sets forth the out11nes, the framework, the baalc-guideposts of an idea, but nothing more.

It supplies no detail, no

partIcular tacts, nothing to t111 in the outlines.

The general

concept 1s only skeletal, a mere theoret1cal out11ne sketch.

To

the contrary, the .further speoif1cat1on ot that concept supplies
tactual deta11s.

It fills out the concept, reduces the general

to the more particular.

It puts flesh on the Skeleton.

This d1stinction applies hare athe very outset of the
present critique. Aristotle has set up happiness as the end of
human life, a state conaisting in the perfection of mants distinctive capacity. his rationality_
It is sound and correct.

Hare is the general concept.

Now, it remains general and sound and

correct when he proceeds to add the note that happiness is
r6alized in a state ot contemplation, that is, a mode of 11 ring
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centered about oontemplative aotivity.

But

it is an inadequate

specification to lImit thIs contemplation to the present, earthly
life.

That this is a weak, inadequate position even Aristotle

himself admits taCitly.

For he quietly concedes that this state

Is not truly self-sufficient (as he had previously sald that the
ultimate end should be) since It requires external props In the
form ot at least minima,l material conveni anCes.
lacking, no happiness'

It th.ea e be

The all-1mportant end ot human nature 1.

thus put beyond the reach of that very nature for many, without
any responsIbility on their part.

Moreover, many persons must

needs work out their entire lifetimes in arduous labor of a sort
precluding anything like a contemplative activity -- must these
also fall'

Arlstotle has failed in his attempt to discover the

universal answer for his universal problem.

If he is seek1ng the

end for human nature, then the end surely should be within the
possible reach of all beings included under human being.
Moreover, if those who do not fulfill the lofty, unreallstic standards whlch he has attempted to set up must be said
to fall, why then do not all such persons manifest the signs of
tailure in this most vltal aspect of life'

Some of them will

strangely oontinue to conduct themselves as persons who actually
are happy'

How can a situation be explained'

Indeed. Aristotle's

genGral concept of the end as flowing from and intrinSically
l1nked to the rational principle 1s sound, but his efforts to

'1"
specif,. this further" to implement the outline with detail, can
only be labeled inadequate.
Sertillanges has comments on this, brief and pointed.
Aristotle baa interest only in this lite. and his 8o-called
happiness 1s restricted to a privileged few, for brief
periods and. 1n precarIous oircumstances. In a .orld dom1nated by material thingl,' by rank and birth, only a small
minor! ty can lead the higher intellectual life. BoW can .e
1ndulge 1n 1 t when we are almost entirely engrossed in f1nd..
1ng the !leceas1 ties ot life. w1 th 11 tt1e time for contemplationt~

The Christian il set a-back upon realizing that, even ill
the 81es of so penetrat1ng a man a8 Aristotle, the slave 1s
claaled a8 non-human.

'fhis wal an unquestioned part 01' the at-

mOlphere of the society in whieh he l1vedJ nevertheless it is
moat regrettably false, a further flaw 1n Aristotle's doctrine

that all theae <many of whom were merely persons who had the
misfortune to be captured 1n war) are unable to be happy.2

The above crit1c1sms reveal a serious def1ciency in his
moral system, a def1ciency crippling it not fatal.
hal set up a tenuous, inadquate end.

For Ar1stotle

His whole moral order (whicb

d.penda for ita vigor and integr1ty on the end) 18 going to be
basically of a similar quality. MoralIty 1. teleologioal.

1 A. D. Sert111anges, Foundat1ona ot Thomist1c Ph!lAAo,&, trans. by Godfrey Anstruther, Hartter !'Ooi eo., !€."""t'O'U18,
X!!J3 • 236.

2 X, 6, 1177&6

78

Aristotle, ot course, is hardly to be blamed for permitting himself to be born in a time and 1n a land where the
revealed word of Almighty God had not yet made itself known.

One

may be certain that such a soul aa Aristotle would have chosen
quite otherwise had the opportunity been extended to him.

But

.uch was not the case, and so b. lived and wrote without any
revealed as.urances about the one Supreme Being, the Creator Who
created w1th His own perfect goodness as the end of His operation,
Arlst·otle had not the exalted momentum imparted to his philosophy that later, Christian thinkers kn... from the impact of God's
eternal truths revealed.

Philosophy, one might say, was favored

with hints fram abovel philosophy was "let in" on some of the
answers --- not the reasons ...... but the anawers.

Philosophy

remained philosophy, but many serious perplex1 ties were largely
diminished, whieh tact proved to be a source of enoouragement and
boundless inspiration.
Christian philosophy has retained the general concept oj
man's end as developed by Aristotle, but in elaborating this
general concept it has 1'ar surpa,uuJd and perfeot$d him.

True,

mants ultimate end and good and perfeotion must consist in the
highest act1vity of man's high.est power, his perfections must
consiat in the fulle.t possible real1zation of that which 18
proper to him, his rat1onality_
eeptl Ohristian ph11osOPh.l bas

This 18 Aristotle's gneral conprof~ndly

augmented it.

For the

'19

supreme good i8 no longer some vague, highly elusive life of
oontemplation here on earth. The supreme good, goodneas itself,
is realized concretely and objectively in God, and mants supreme
end as known by natural reason thus consists in the perfect

natural possesaion of the perfect good, God Himselfl

Man is

ordained to enter into the poseession of God by the most perfect
spiritual operation attainable to him, and to do this in a state
where even the poss1biUty of' term1nation exists no longer.
can only be in a future 11fe beyond the grave.

!hi.

The doctrine of

the immortality of the aoul which enjoyed a full flowering only

1n Christian philoaophies lends further support to this sublime
truth of man's end (i.e., :t:inis guo).

-- Al'latotle perceIved man's

tural desire for happiness, for good and for, moreover, perfect
ood, but he was unable to probe the Significant origin of this
esire or to recognize that the supreme good is concretely identified with the source of all being, which is good, the Oreator
odl 3

a It ia well to not. that this statement i8 not intenas a denial that Aristotle had some concept, however vague, ot
od ... beatIfying object of mants con\;emplatlon, but rather that
ia concept waa obsoure because ot a lack of understanding. Be
i.se. the whole relationship at God as Creator and last end
ecause he Simply did not know the doctrine ot creatIon. It
emalned tor Christian philosophy both to tighten and to clarity
he int1mate relationShip between God and man, to aee God as
anta or1gin and creative legislator as well as his tinal, ultimte end' The greateat of the pagan thinkers d1d not possess the
lentitude of knowledge Which today, under the Christian dispenation, 1. the oommon inheritance at the faithful multitude, the
ed

80
...

It i8 oomparatively easy to criticize those minds, however gifted, which a.ntedated the Ohristian era.
to overshoot the mark in
••vere limitationa.
~ond«rs
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And it is easy

doing, thereby exposing one's own

For this colosaul of intelleot achieved

with the evidence at his disposal, and worked miracle. of

mind surely paralleling. at least, the giants of scientific exploration who so captivate the spotlight in our times.

All throug 0.

the present evaluation, then, it i. well to bear 1n mind the pas.
itive

acb1.V6m~nts 80

8011dly underlying the ulually superstruct.

IUral inadequacies and deviationa.
Ariatotle wat oorrect in ppointing out that the manner
'by

which man 18 to take hold. of the ultimate good 1s primerIl,.

that of intelleotion.

Christian phIlosophy haa, rather inev-

itably, held to this.

Beatitude is to be had through the moat

perfeot ule of the most perfect (and specific) faculty, which, of
cOUl'se, is intellect.

But now the object of this activity is

known to be other than he bad supposed.
It was unavoidable on hl.. part to regard man'.. end
solely from the aspect at form.

It 8uffloes for the present

purposes to note that this notion 1s tint1rely correct 80 far
a. 1t goea, but it do •• not .ufficiantly take into account the
ea.entlal relation to an end extrinsic to man, namelf, greate.t
pos8ible union wlth the perfect good, God. - In connection w1th
th1. atatement it 1. 1nstruct1ve to correlate a lIttle-noted
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.,

pas.age In the l!!. Anima. 4l5a 25 -b5, where Aristotle states that
all things animate .trive tor the divine ineof8l' a8 their nature.
makes thia possible.

~is

line ot thought, however, i. not

stressed 1n the Ethios and hence not in the present study_
To Aristotle, God was but the bague, impersonal prime
mover.

Moreover, this prime mover moved not as efficient cause

but only

lUI

f'inal cause (this notion, however, not applied to

man, or, if' so" onl;r in the most obscure manner).

Ue was not the

creator and hence not the law-giver, nor the ultimate good and
super-mundane end.
p~rceived

Even the brilliant intellect of Aristotle

all but nothing of' man's origin and only a shadow of'

his true end, hence he labored under a sorely impoverished conoept
of human nature Itself. -- One Aristotelian scholar has noted that
ttThroughou t the Eth10s
, • • • the oonoept1on ot God 18 not brought
into the problem. ot the norm.· 4 Gilson alao e01l\lllents that, tor
Aristotle, 8the Firat Unmoved Mover makes no attempt to legislate
tor man • • • he is not the creator of conso1enoes". 5
Aristotle holds that manta perfect10n oonsists in the
realisation of' his essentIal form, and this i8 conceded.
•

But,

b

4 Werner Jaeger f Aristotle, trans. by Richard Robinson.
Clarendon press, Oxford, 1934, Dll, note 2.
5 Etienne G1lson, The S2ir1t or Mediaeval Philoso2hZ.
trans. by A. B. C. Downes, ScrrDnerfs, N~ York, 1040, SSI.
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again, the i"'nadequacy is glaring.

For it this 1s the primal law

ot eXiltence, the next question arlses 1mmediately. who or what
determines 1 t?

Cwtainly the ph11sopher does not oomplete his

task once he has established the taot ot a law; he must, it he
would be complete, proceed to explain the reason and cause behind
the law.

D.l t Aristotle halts here.

Ris fundamental metaphysics

has not been exhausted; he has failed to draw from it all that it
germinally oontained.

For bad he done so (whlch, admittedly is

asking the almost superhuman from what is, at beat, weakly human)
he would have ultimately arrived. at ooncepts of an Infinite
Being, then eternal law, and creation.

The primal law tor Aris-

totle of torm striving tor self-realization would be seen as a
dictate ot order depending fundamentally upon the wisdom ot a
supreme Law-giver,

The es.ential form, the nature of a being,

would then have been seen to be determined by the Oreator's
eternal law.

The balia tendencies of the rational nature are

only the expression of that ultimate, absolute, eternal law as
promulgated in the creature -- and this is the nature law.

Thus

he gave the basis for aphilosophy ot natural law, but this effort
alone bad extended him to the uttermost limits of his vast genius
and he was unable to develop it,

On this point Gilson again

makes an Intereattng statement,
Dut,. is not to be decluced from a revelation but from a
dootrine of oreation Which 1s itself deduo;A from a metaphysIc of BeIng. An4 this metaphysic of Being Is deduced
trom nothing but the eXigencies of rational thought. It is
altogether natural, therefore, that morality ot obligation
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should find 1tself In no cor111ot w1tn Greek ethlcs; the
Greeks themselves would have atta~ned to 1 t had they but
pushed their metaphysics further.
Aristotle, then, presents only one half of the oomplete
truth.

Moral obl1gat10n rests 1ndeed upon human nature itself, aa

he haa sald, but ultimately it rests upon the intelligent designs
of a personal Creator.
From the foregoing It follows that his doctrine of
praotical wisdom a180 limps.

Bow, one who limps stIll walks, but

he falls to walk as well as a man should, and so with Aristotle.
He limps.

His practical wisdom is a rather vague, somewhat

1~

conolusive explanation of how a man is made aware of the lines of
oonduct he ought to follow and ought to avoid.

The onlr explan-

ation it seems Aristotle could offer tor this spontaneous service

on behalf of the intellect 1s that, as part of the Whole nature,
it too must perform Its part in cooperation wi th the Whole nature
and perform it according to its own peculiar nature.

No one

oar•• to asy this is false, but It 1s facile, and the non-philosopher might well express his susplclons in the matter by objecting that "it I am the only one giving orders to mrself, 11' it
is all my own doing anyway, I need not teel averse to disobeying
myself now and then".

'golden rule'.

6

This would be something ot an inverted

Aristotle tailed to recognize that the Interior

Ibid., 362

.,

of the ratIonal faculty in practical matters of ·ought-

p~omptings

and ·ought not" are part of nature, yes, but part of nature as
ordained by a Creator Who has created intell1gently, aocording to
a plan, and haa therefore embedded wi thin the form of hia creat.
res an impulse (in man's case. then, a rational impulse) to
respect and follow the

pattern~h1ch

Ris infinite intellect and

will have .stab1ished. As it should be noted that corollary
criticism immediately suggesting itaelt, Aristotle lacks the
.ssentially

sta~1zing

note on which to ground a doctrine of

obligation, an ultimate, absolute authorIty_
A.n interesting sidelight on the foregoing comment may
be made by noting that Aristotle lacked a proper notion (or,
praotioally, any no t1.on) of au thor! tZ;, principally becaus e he had
no true knowledge ot the author- of human existenoe.

And this 1s

oonsiderably more than a play upon the words.
He was quite correct in hIs apparently instinctive
ettorts to provide tor an awareness in man of his obligations.
For without knowledge ot what is good and not good to do, the
subject would be unable to lndend formally the material good or
evil which actually flowed from his action.
tion. there i8 no responsibility. no moral

And without intenact~

no obligation.

But having gone thus tar wi tb. truth, again his doctrine talla
open to the charge 01' inadequacy.

For, he holds, if one submits

the case of a good intention coupled with invincible ignorance t
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answ.r can only be most unsatisfaotory.

The man. in his philos-

ophy, who acts wrongly even though in all good faith would. it
aeams, miss the end. since the connect1on was purely physlcal,
mechanical, not moral.

A. certain pragmatism appears here.

E1 ther

the man elects actions which do actually carry him on to the end,

or, good intention notWithstanding, he falls.
secularists.

This 1s true of all

Only 11' there be a moral link, merit, and a moral

judge, God, to take acoount of formal morality of acts can this
lunfortunate situation be overcome.

It is olear that this is

suspiciously close to a marely chance morality, and on this very
pOint one author goea so far aa to state that -.. a matter 01'
taot, obligation is so loose in Aristotle that its very existencd

Iha-

been denied.-?
On the foregoing charge ot pragmatism in Aristotle, (or,

~ather,

that his ethics tends to that), Gilson notes that, in

~rlstotle,

doubtless a means is good

only because
good because
the end. If
on demand he
ot his moral

1t leads us to the end • • • , but 1t 1s not
1t 1s adopted tor the purpose at atta1ning
man ls always careful to l1ve as nature and re_
w111 find. thereby his beati tude, but the value
acts dOGS not depend on any 1ntentional1ty.8

It seems a lomewhat harsh cr1ticis. to label the morality of the Etnica a ·chance morality-. for there 18 definitely
~n

order of means to a set end, and a certain moral neoeas1ty
7
8

Sert1l1ang •• , 239.
Gilson, 356.
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Im1mpo.ed upon the will to pursue the known mealUl.
is tar trom being air-tight. as haa pointed out.

ot obligation arls1ng from

80

This system
But the factor

.fixed a foundation as mants very

nature itself i8 not to be easl1y set aside.

True, very true,

the ultimate foundation wa$ overlooked entirely, but some foundation was establlshed, and a foundation not to be llghtly
este.ed.

Inadequate 1 t may be,

but

at least it

I~I

That 1.

something.
Arlstotle t a ult1mate aauction imposed on those unfortunates who fall to achieve the end i8, beyond that failure Itself', a certain perverslon ot character.
There ls some reallty

to~

Thi. 1s a b1t tenuou.s.

-- wltness, tor example, the physical

horrors visited upon viotims of venereal diseases.

01'

the fam-

iliar and. tragic hardness of heart whioh develops among con-

scienceless persons such as .fanatical »&&1. or Communist•• - but
it is agaIn inadequate.

It is much too arbltrary; i8 there, for

example, any guarantee whatsoever that nature works a certain
vengeanoe upon those who flaunt their obligations in proportion
as they so a.ct,

Hardly.

The only evldenoe here i8 utterly in...

complete and inconolusive.
But Aristotle had no dootrine of immorta11ty •• at
least, 1 t oertainlr had no influenoe on h1s ethioal theory even
if philosophical susp101ons ot i t

e~er

lingered in his mind.

Therefore, philosophically, he could not know of a retribution
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atter death.

The end he established was purely mundane; so was

the correspond1ng sanction.

Knowledge of the eternal intent10ns

of the eternal Creator in creating man would have profoundly
Altered his posltion.
Kucn ot the same can be said concerning Aristotle's
1dea of human freedom.

He everywhere asserts the fact.

Whl of it must always elude him.

But the

He recognizes it as indispen-

sable to moral lite, but he remains ignorant of its position in
the divine pattern ot human probation and reward.
Aristotelian ob11gation is loose as well as ot a highly speculative character.

Its looseness 1s a consequence of the

fact that the end he has set up for human nature 1s somewhat
broad and general. Be has attempted to concret1ze it as a state

ot contemplation, but this rema1ns at best vague and indefin1te_
Moreover, he doe8 11ttle to part1cularize and specify those means
necessary to the end, the necessary virtues.

In the ordination

to such an end, obligation, though real, is indeed 1008e. Aristotle must have felt this personally.
B1s obligation 1s 11kewise speculative.

To establish

1t requ1res metaphys1cal cons1derations which might well appear
to have scant relat10n to the concrete realIt1es of dally human
liv1ng. And obligation, of all problems in phl1oaoph1, is surely
concerned wi th the day br dar dOings ot human existence.

The

8S
~

Chr1stian philosopher's obligat1on involves a concept of human
or1g1n and human end which bas tmmeasurably greater cogency than
the pagan l1ne of thought.

Thus, looked at trom a basis ot mere

ut11ity, pagan obligat1on 1s little likely to deter the steps of
a man who knows the power of the all too familiar human passions.
And the history of pagan civi11zation bears sad witness to this
clear tact.

fin i
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